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Abstract
The president determines the number of refugees to be admitted to the United States each
year after consultation with Congress, but there is a gap in literature related to whether
party affiliation affects refugee admissions. The purpose of this study was to determine
the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on refugee admissions and any
moderating effect of Congressional majority affiliations. The eight research questions
centered on the effect of the president’s party on the refugee ceiling and admissions,
regional allocations and admissions, and the extent to which Congressional majority
parties moderate these effects. Total global and regional refugee numbers were controlled
throughout this study. The theoretical framework of historical institutionalism was used
to examine political parties as institutions guided by historical positions and choices. This
quantitative study involved a secondary data analysis of data collected from the U.S.
government and the United Nations. Hierarchical regression was used to determine the
relationship between refugee admissions and presidential party affiliation, as well as the
moderating effect of the Senate and House majorities. Regression analysis showed that
presidential party affiliation had no significant effect on the refugee admissions, but
having a Democratic president was predictive of higher admissions of refugees from both
the Near East and South Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. Future researchers
may examine additional ways that presidential administrations, rather than Congress,
affect refugee admissions. Positive social change implications include furthering
understanding of the role of party affiliation in refugee admissions to help refugee service
providers better prepare for the refugees that will be admitted in the upcoming fiscal year.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
The Refugee Act (1980) outlines the process for admitting refugees to the United
States. The Refugee Act established that the admissions ceiling, the maximum number of
refugees permitted for admission to the United States in a given year, and regional
allocations, the maximum number of refugees to be admitted to the United States from
specific geographic regions in a given year, is to be set by the president, annually (§
207(a)(1)). The president does this each year by issuing a presidential determination, after
sending a report to Congress and consulting with the Senate and House Committees on
the Judiciary, also known as the Judiciary Committees (§ 207(d)(1)). In this study, I
examined the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on annual admissions
ceiling and regional allocations. I also examined whether the political party affiliation of
the Senate and House majorities moderated any effect the president’s party affiliation has
on the same. Because the global number of refugees fluctuates over time, this study
controlled for the total number of global refugees as well as global refugee totals by
geographic region.
In Chapter 1, I review the background on the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
and provide an overview of the literature related to this study. I outline the purpose of the
study, the research problem, and research questions (RQs) and provide an overview of
the nature of the study. Chapter 1 includes a preview of historical institutionalism as the
theoretical framework for this study, with further discussion in Chapter 2. Finally, this
chapter includes a list of definitions relevant to this study and discussion of the
assumptions, scope, limitations, and significance of this study.
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Background
Before the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, U.S. refugee law and policy were
not wholly distinct from broader U.S. immigration policy, and the United States did not
have federal law defining refugees that was in line with international law (Scribner, 2017;
Teitelbaum, 1980). The Refugee Act aligned U.S. federal law with the definition of
“refugee” as outlined in the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967), which the
United States had signed in 1967. The Refugee Act established the current United States
Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) and determined that the president would consult
with Congress each year regarding refugee admissions (§ 207(d)(1)) and set the number
of refugees permitted to be admitted through the USRAP annually. Research published
within months of the passage of the Refugee Act points to political disagreement about
the admission of refugees and other immigrants to the United States (Teitelbaum, 1980).
However, that study did not identify which group or groups held the differing positions
that its author presented.
Refugees are a subset of the broader U.S. immigrant population, having been
granted entry to the United States with refugee status through the USRAP under the
provisions of the Refugee Act. Although little research has been done on the effect of
political party affiliation of the president or the chambers of Congress on refugee
admissions, much more research is available on political party affiliation and immigration
policy more broadly (Breshnahan, et al., 2018; Brown & Brown, 2017; Chacon, 2017;
Doucerain, et al., 2018; Druckman, et al., 2013; Fennelly, et al., 2015; Finley & Esposito,
2020; Fussell, 2014; Hajnal & Rivedram 2014). Through the 1950s and 1960s, before the
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Refugee Act, Congressional Republicans and Democrats were divided on immigration
reforms related to maintaining or eliminating national origin quotas (Triadafilopoulos,
2010). These quotas limited the number of immigration visas issued based on nationality
and excluded most immigrants from Asia (U.S. Department of State, n.d.g). This early
debate on immigration reform saw Republicans favoring maintaining national origin
quotas. At the same time, Democrats opposed the quotas and advocated for increased
immigration from multiple countries (Triadafilopoulos, 2010). This trend continued
through the recent 2018 midterm elections (Torres-Gill & Demko, 2018).
A review of asylum cases adjudicated in the 1980s found that asylum seekers who
had their cases adjudicated by Republican-appointed judges were less likely to be granted
asylum than those whose cases were adjudicated by judges appointed by Democratic
presidents (Yarnold, 1990). Researchers examining political positions have found that
immigration similarly fell along party lines (Barnett, 2002; Breshnahan, et al., 2018;
Hajnal & Rivera, 2014). Fennelly et al. (2015), in their study of votes taken on
immigration-related legislation in the 103rd through the 112th Congress (1993-2012),
found that Republicans consistently favored restricting immigration while Democrats
consistently voted in favor of expanding it. Fennelly et al. also noted that votes on
immigration-related issues were “more likely to pit a majority of Democrats against a
majority of Republicans than votes on all issues combined” (p. 1423). Other researchers
have consistently found that Republicans are more likely to favor and vote for restrictive
immigration policies than Democrats, who are more likely to support fewer immigration
restrictions (Brown & Brown, 2017; Durometer & Méango, 2017; Hawley, 2011).
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Despite these findings, little research has been devoted to the effect of political
party affiliation on refugee policy, specifically, until the election of Donald Trump.
Trump made refugee policy part of his platform as a presidential candidate. During the
Trump campaign, then-candidate Trump promised to send Syrian refugees admitted
through the USRAP back to Syria and ban Muslim refugees from entry to the United
States (Scribner, 2017, p. 265). Following his election to the presidency, Trump enacted
Executive Order No. 13,769 (2017) banning the issuance of visas to immigrants and
refugees from several Muslim-majority countries, reducing the overall number of
refugees admitted to the United States for the fiscal year (FY), and indefinitely banning
entry of Syrian refugees to the United States. Executive Order No. 13,769 was
superseded by Executive Order No. 13,780, which, like the order that preceded it,
reduced refugee admissions to the United States for the FY, although permitted
exceptions for entry to the United States from otherwise banned countries for individuals
who were granted refugee status.
In the wake of the 2016 election of President Trump, a substantial body of
research has been published on the political division over refugee policy, much of it
along political party lines (Adida, et al., 2019; Finley & Esposito, 2020; Fullerton, 2017;
Johnson, 2018; Saldaña, et al., 2018). The authors of these studies have focused mainly
on divisions under the current administration, without consideration for a review of
political party positions on refugee admissions before the Trump administration.
Although these researchers have looked at political divisions, they, like scholars who
have studied earlier divisions on immigration policy along party lines, have not examined
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data related to refugee admissions. Several researchers (Harvard, 2018; Simeon, 2017;
Walden, et al., 2017) noted that global refugee levels reached several new annual
recorded highs between 2015 and 2019 but did not provide an analysis of the impact of
these changes on U.S. refugee resettlement levels.
I addressed that gap by examining the effect of the political party affiliation of the
president on refugee admissions since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980.
Furthermore, I examined whether the political party affiliation of the Senate and House
majorities moderate any effect that presidential party affiliation has on refugee
admissions through the USRAP. This study clarified not only whether there are political
divisions on refugee policy, but the implication of those divisions on refugee admissions
to the United States. I controlled for annual global refugee levels, both in aggregate and
by region, when analyzing the effect of party affiliation on refugee admissions to the
United States.
Problem Statement
Since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, the number of refugees admitted to
the United States has been set before the beginning of each federal FY by the president (§
207(a)(1)), in consultation with the Committees of the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives and the Senate (§ 207(d)(1)). The reports submitted for review to the
House and Senate Judiciary Committees detail not only the overall number of refugees to
be admitted during the upcoming FY, but also the number to be admitted from individual
regions of the world and from specific population groups. Despite research on the
politicization of asylum in the United States beginning in the 1980s (Yarnold, 1990) and

6
analysis on the effect of political party affiliation on legislative efforts related to
immigration since the mid-1990s (Hinojosa & Schey, 1995), little research has been
conducted on the extent to which the political party affiliation of the president affects
refugee admissions and whether that effect is moderated by the political party affiliations
of the Senate and House majorities.
Following the election of Donald Trump, his administration enacted a series of
changes to refugee policy and the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP)
(Randolph, 2017). As a result, several articles related to the executive orders and USRAP
changes, as well as to the political party divide on refugee policy, were published
(Chacón, 2017; Fording & Schram, 2017; Fullerton, 2017; Gostin, 2017; Martin & Ferris,
2017; Nagel, 2016; Scribner, 2017). Although the recent literature has highlighted current
political divides on refugee policy, it has not provided an analysis of the effect of political
party on proposed and actual refugee admissions through the USRAP, either in aggregate
or by regional or specific population groups. This research addressed the gap in
understanding the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on proposed
refugee admissions, as outlined in the annual admissions ceilings and regional
allocations, and actual refugee admissions through the USRAP, in aggregate and by
region, since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, while controlling for global refugee
levels, in aggregate and by region. I further explored whether the political party
affiliation of the Senate and House majorities moderates any effect of the president’s
political party affiliation on refugee admissions, while controlling for overall and regional
global refugee numbers.
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Purpose
The purpose of this study was to determine the extent to which the political party
affiliation of the president affects the proposed refugee admissions, as outlined in the
annual admissions ceilings and regional allocations, and actual refugee admissions
through the USRAP and whether that effect is moderated by the political party
affiliations of the Senate and House majorities. In this quantitative study, I explored how
the dependent variable of the political party affiliation of the president affects the
variables of the annual admissions ceiling, actual annual admissions, regional allocations,
and actual regional admissions, while controlling for global refugee population levels. I
also examined whether the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on refugee admissions, while
controlling for the number of refugees worldwide and by region. These variables were
reviewed by federal FY since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, which established
the current refugee admissions process.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
RQ1: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on the
USRAP annual admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals?
H01: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant
effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.
Ha1: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant
effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.
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RQ2: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on total
annual admissions through the USRAP, when controlling for global refugee totals?
H02: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant
effect on total annual admissions through the USRAP.
Ha2: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant
effect on total annual admissions through the USRAP.
RQ3: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on
USRAP regional allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?
H03: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant
effect on USRAP regional allocations.
Ha3: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant
effect on USRAP regional allocations.
RQ4: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on
USRAP regional admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?
H04: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant
effect on USRAP regional admissions.
Ha4: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant
effect on USRAP regional admissions.
RQ5: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the USRAP annual
admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals?
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H05: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on
USRAP annual admissions ceiling.
Ha5: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the
USRAP annual admissions ceiling.
RQ6: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total annual admissions
through the USRAP, when controlling for global refugee totals?
H06: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total
annual admissions through the USRAP.
Ha6: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total
annual admissions through the USRAP.
RQ7: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional
allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?
H07: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on
USRAP regional allocations.
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Ha7: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on
USRAP regional allocations.
RQ8: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional
admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?
H08: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on
USRAP regional admissions.
Ha8: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on
USRAP regional admissions.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework for this study was historical institutionalism. Historical
institutionalism understands institutions, including political parties, as guided in decision
making by historical positions and choices (Steinmo et al., 1992). This path dependence,
or dependence on previous decisions and historical directions, makes institutions slow to
change. Ware (1996) noted that this dependence can make institutions into “prisoners [of]
their own history” (p. 18) and reluctant to move in new directions. Although historical
institutionalism is tied closely to the concept of path dependence, it does not maintain
that institutions are unable to change. Sorensen (2015) argued that institutional change
does occur, often through incremental steps, but other times through “major upheavals”
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(p. 19) that lead to new institutional positions or directions. Although gradual,
incremental change is frequently a result of forces within the institution, whereas abrupt
changes are often caused by external forces (Capoccia, 2016). As my focus was on
examining the effects of political party affiliation on refugee admissions, I evaluated the
extent to which parties have either remained steadfast in their positions, as exemplified in
current political divisions over refugee admissions, or if the Trump administration’s
policies represent an abrupt departure from past policy positions. Historical
institutionalism is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
Nature of the Study
The nature of this study was quantitative research using a nonexperimental
correlative design. It was an independent-measure study consistent with the goal of
understanding how the political party affiliation affects refugee admission to the United
States. Both proposed and actual refugee admissions, in aggregate and by region, were
examined by federal FY compared to the political party affiliations of the president and
Senate and House majorities during the same FYs. Data on refugee admissions were
available online through the Refugee Processing Center (RPC), which is operated by the
U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). The
RPC makes refugee admissions data since 1975, including data by region, available
online. The RPC also makes available online the annual reports to Congress since FY
2004. Annual Presidential Determinations on refugee admissions since the passage of the
Refugee Act of 1980 were available through the Federal Register.
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Definitions
Admissions ceiling: The maximum number of refugees permitted to enter the
United States in a given FY, as set annually by presidential determination (Martin &
Yankay, 2013).
Asylee: A type of immigrant. As it relates to this study, an asylee is an individual
in the United States, or at a port of entry to the United States, who is unable to return to
or to avail themselves of the protection of their country of nationality (or, for those
without a nationality, outside of their country of habitual residence) due to a wellfounded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group and is seeking protection in the United States.
Asylees in the United States are present in the country before being granted asylum status
(International Rescue Committee, 2018; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service
[USCIS], n.d.a).
Bureau of Populations, Refugees, and Migration (PRM): A bureau of the U.S.
Department of State that has primary management responsibility for USRAP, including
responsibility for overseas refugee processing and managing processing priorities
(USCIS, n.d.b).
Country of first asylum: The first safe country that an individual travels to after
fleeing their country of origin (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
[UNHCR], n.d.).
Federal fiscal year (FY): The U.S. federal FY, which operates October through
September and is named according to the year in which the FY ends (e.g., October 2018–

13
September 2019 is FY19). Refugee admissions to the United States are managed on a FY
basis (USAGov, n.d.).
House majority: The political party holding the majority of seats in the House of
Representatives; the House Majority Leader is elected by the party holding the majority
of seats in the House as their spokesperson for their party (U.S. House of
Representatives, n.d., para. 6).
Immigrant: A broad term that refers to an individual born outside the United
States as a non-U.S. citizen and who now resides in the United States (International
Rescue Committee, 2018).
Presidential determination: For the purpose of this study, a document issued by
the president each FY that establishes the overall number of refugees to be admitted to
the United States during the upcoming FY and number of refugees per region who can be
admitted (USCIS, n.d.b).
Presidential party: The “organization that selected and supported the candidate
who ran under its label and who subsequently became president” (Passarelli, 2019, p. 88).
Refugee: A specific type of immigrant who is outside of their country of
nationality (or, for those without a nationality, outside of their country of habitual
residence) and who is unable to return to or to avail themselves of the protection of that
country due to a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion,
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group (8 USC 12 §
1101(a)(42)). Refugees in the United States are accepted to the U.S. Refugee Admissions
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Program (USRAP) while outside of the United States and then enter the United States on
a refugee visa (International Rescue Committee, 2018).
Regional admissions: The number of refugees admitted from a specific global
region during a federal FY (Bruno, 2018, p. 6).
Regional allocations: The maximum number of refugees permitted to enter the
United States from each region of the world in a given FY. These allocations are subsets
of the overall admissions ceiling (Martin & Yankay, 2013).
Report to Congress: For the purpose of this study, an annual report submitted on
behalf of the president to the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary with
proposed refugee admissions for the upcoming FY (U.S. Department of State, 2018).
Senate majority: The political party holding the majority of seats in the Senate;
the Senate Majority Leader is elected by the party holding the majority of seats in the
Senate as the spokesperson for their party (U.S. Senate, n.d., para. 2).
Total global refugees: Total global refugees recognized in accordance with the
UNHCR Statute, not including Palestinian refugees in the Near East, who are under the
mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the
Near East (Goddard, 2009, p. 475).
Unallocated reserve: The number of refugee admissions slots not designated for a
specific geographic region but reserved to be used for refugees from any region should
the need develop for refugee slots in excess of the number provided in the regional
allocation (Bruno, 2015, Summary section, para. 1).
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United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP): An interagency
collaboration between governmental and nongovernmental agencies in the United States
and abroad to identify, screen, and admit refugees for resettlement to the United States
(USCIS, n.d.b).
Assumptions
In this study, I assumed that the president has more considerable influence over
refugee admissions than does Congress. This assumption is based on the fact that the
president sets proposed refugee admissions by presidential determination (Refugee Act of
1980 § 94 U.S.C. § 207 (a)(1)) based on an annual report to Congress by the current
administration (§ 207 (d)(1)). Although both the Senate and House Committees on the
Judiciary consult with the president on refugee admissions, it is the presidential
determination that ultimately sets the final admissions number, both in total and by
region. Therefore, I examined the effect of presidential political party affiliation on
proposed and actual refugee admissions, while reviewing the potential moderation of
those effects by the political party affiliations of Senate and House majorities.
Scope and Delimitations
Given the relatively short history of refugee admissions to the United States under
the Refugee Act of 1980, I examined data from FY81-FY19, inclusively. FY81, which
began October 1, 1980, is the first FY in which refugees were admitted to the United
States following the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, which was signed into law on
March 17, 1980. FY19 was the most recent FY for which complete refugee admissions
data were available at the time of this study’s proposal. Because this study included
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complete data from all years of refugee admissions since the passage of the Refugee Act,
there are no generalizability concerns.
I controlled for the total number of refugees globally, as well as the total
population of refugees by geographic region since the passage of the Refugee Act. The
UNHCR, the U.N. refugee agency, makes global refugee numbers available for all
refugees worldwide, as well as by refugee country of nationality. Worldwide refugee
population data are available from the UNHCR, beginning with data from 1951. I
included data beginning from 1979.
Limitations
This study was limited in its focus on Senate and House majorities rather than on
the individual members of the Senate and House Committees of the Judiciary. Although
majorities of both Committees reflect the majorities in each chamber of the Congress, this
study did not account for the relative influence of members of the Judiciary Committees.
I also did not account for the nature of the relationship between the chairs of the Judiciary
Committees and the president.
This study is also limited to analysis of the effect of political party affiliation and
did not include a consideration of external political factors, which may be confounding
variables. Although global refugee levels, both in aggregate and by region, may be effects
of global political events, I did not address those political events specifically. Previous
studies have demonstrated that refugee populations resettled by the United States are
negatively correlated with locations of U.S. military engagement without regard for the
severity of the refugee situation in those locations (Berman, 2011, p 124). Future
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researchers could explore external factors, such as military engagement, as covariates
with political party to analyze their effect on refugee admissions.
Because the study includes data from each year since the passage of the Refugee
Act of 1980 (FY81-FY19) and each year of global refugee data for calendar years 19792018 from the UNHCR, the outcomes are valid as the entire population being studied was
available rather than a sample of the population. Because PRM’s regional groupings of
countries changed over time, each FY (FY81-FY03) required some level of
recategorization of countries into region to align with current regional groupings.
Additionally, the UNHCR does not categorize countries into region in its annual data,
and countries of nationality and countries of first asylum were grouped into regions
corresponding with Department of State regional designations. These categorizations and
recategorizations into groupings that could be compared over time are a potential threat
to internal validity in this study (see Babbie, 2017). I discus the process of
operationalizing these variables in detail in Chapter 3. In discussions of the relationship
between the Trump administration, it should be noted that the FYs included in this study
only account for a portion of the years of the Trump administration and do not include
presidential determinations for FY20 or FY21 and arrivals for FY20.
Significance
I found no reviews of the effect of political party affiliation on proposed or actual
refugee admissions through the USRAP that were published before the election of
President Trump. Without a review of the extent to which party affiliation has affected
refugee admissions historically, one cannot identify whether the current political divide
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on refugee policy is a contemporary anomaly or whether it has existed since the
enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980. This research addresses the gap in understanding
the current political divisions related to refugee policy within the broader context of the
history of the USRAP. It provides a framework for understanding the relationship
between political party and refugee policy for those working in refugee admissions and
resettlement.
Despite the lack of research on the subject, refugee resettlement and human rights
organizations hold that the USRAP has long held bipartisan support before the current
administration (Human Rights First, n.d.; U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants
[USCRI], 2017). The ability to anticipate the number of refugee admissions and the
backgrounds of those refugees is essential to refugee resettlement organizations. As
funding for refugee resettlement is provided by the U.S. government on a per capita basis
(i.e., funded based on the number of refugees the organization resettles each year; U.S.
Department of State, 2017), the ability to anticipate the number of refugee admissions in
an upcoming FY is critical to a resettlement agency’s ability to plan fiscally. Predicting
the background of refugees who will be admitted through the USRAP helps resettlement
organizations prepare for the specific linguistic and cultural needs of anticipated refugee
groups. This study contributes to positive social change by providing resettlement
agencies with information to help prepare in advance for the number and backgrounds of
refugees that will be admitted through the USRAP. Resettlement agencies may be better
equipped to anticipate refugee admissions and, as a result, improve the quality of services
that newly admitted refugees receive.
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Summary
Despite the existing research on the correlation between political party affiliation
and immigration policy positions and the current research on political party affiliation as
it relates to refugee policy, there is no research on the effect of political party affiliation
on the implementation of refugee policy as measured by proposed and actual refugee
admissions. As resettlement agencies are funded on a per capita basis, the ability to
anticipate the number of refugees who will be admitted to the United States in an
upcoming FY against a current FY is vital to financial planning. Likewise, the ability to
anticipate regional allocations in future years against a current year allows agencies to
plan for the cultural and linguistic needs of the refugees they will serve. Chapter 2
provides a thorough review of existing literature. I also substantiate historical
institutionalism as the appropriate framework for this study.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to determine the extent to which the political party
affiliation of the president affects proposed refugee admissions, as outlined in the annual
admissions ceilings and regional allocations, and actual refugee admissions through the
USRAP and whether these effects are moderated by the political party affiliations of the
Senate and House majorities, while controlling for global and regional refugee levels.
The resettlement agencies that provide refugee resettlement services in cooperation with
the USRAP hold that refugee resettlement enjoyed bipartisan support before the election
of Donald Trump (USCRI, 2017). Recent literature (Adida et al., 2019; Finley &
Esposito, 2020; Fullerton, 2017; Johnson, 2018; Saldaña, et al., 2018; Schmidt, 2019;
Scribner, 2017) has highlighted political divisions on refugee policy under the Trump
administration but has not provided an analysis of political divisions or unity before the
Trump administration.
In this chapter, I provide an overview of the literature search strategy and the
theoretical framework of this study and review the existing literature. This literature
review includes a history of refugee resettlement in the United States before the passage
of the Refugee Act of 1980; the passage of the Refugee Act and the establishment of the
USRAP; political positions on immigration, broadly, and refugee policy, specifically,
since the passage of the Refugee Act; and refugee policy under the Trump administration.
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Literature Search Strategy
I used Google Scholar and several databases available through Walden
University, including Academic Search Complete, Nexis Uni (formerly LexisNexis
Academic), Political Science Complete, ProQuest Central, SAGE Journals, SAGE
Premier, and the multidatabase search engine Thoreau Multi-Database Search, to identify
relevant literature. Search terms for these databases included USRAP, United States
Refugee Admissions Program, refugee resettlement, admissions ceiling, refugee
admissions ceiling, refugee priority groups, refugee politics, refugee policy, immigration
policy, and refugee P2 groups, and the Boolean searches USRAP “political party,”
“refugee admissions” “political party,” immigration “political party,” asylum “political
party,” refugee “presidential determination,” refugee “report to congress,” refugee
“political party,” and “admissions ceiling” “political party.” The focus of these searches
was peer-reviewed literature published 2015-2020. Because research has not been
conducted on the history of political positions related to refugee policy and admissions, I
included limited searches for relevant literature in the 2000s, 1990s, and 1980s that could
provide contemporaneous accounts of political beliefs about immigration and refugee
policy.
In reviewing the available literature, I found limited studies on refugee policy in
the United States, the majority of which focused on policies related to the services
refugees receive following their resettlement (Dubus, 2018; Gilhooly & Lee, 2017;
Gonzalez Benson, 2017). Few studies considered refugee admissions policy, and those
that did were primarily concerned with refugee admissions policies beginning in the
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Trump administration (Fullerton, 2017; Gostin, 2017; Saldaña, et al., 2018). Given these
limitations, the literature review was broadened to include studies on immigration policy
in the United States, as refugee policies are a subset of broader immigration policy. Also
considered was the limited research that has been conducted on asylum policy in the
United States, as asylum policy and refugee policy are related in that both asylees and
refugees are defined in U.S. and international law as individuals feeling persecution in
their country of nationality (Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952; Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, 1967).
Theoretical Foundation
The theoretical framework for this study was historical institutionalism. Steinmo
et al. (1992) first discussed historical institutionalism in Structuring Politics: Historical
Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis, in which they defined institutions as
organizations as well as the rules, practices, norms, values, and social conventions that
order the organization’s conduct. These institutions can include branches of government,
political parties, and the structure of political party systems (Steinmo et al., 1992). In
seeking to understand institutions and institutional behavior, historical institutionalism is
concerned with not only contemporary institutional positions and practices but also the
origins of those positions and practices, viewing institutions as “the legacy of historical
processes” (Thelen, 1999, p. 382). Historical institutionalism argues that the strategies
and goals pursued by individuals within organizations are shaped by their institutional
and organizational contexts (Steinmo et al., 1992).
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As with other branches of neo-institutionalism, historical institutionalism includes
path dependence as a central idea. Path dependence holds that, once an institution
establishes a belief or practice, it becomes increasingly difficult to change that idea or
practice as time progresses (Fioretos, 2011). Consequently, beliefs and choices that occur
early on in an institution’s development can have a significant impact over the life of the
institution (Sorensen, 2015, p. 21). Given this path dependence, theorists must explain
how institutional change occurs, despite the institutional tendency to remain set in an
established path. Before Steinmo et al.’s (1992) seminal work on historical
institutionalism, the prominent model of understanding institutional change in neoinstitutional literature was punctuated equilibrium. In the punctuated equilibrium model,
institutions generally enjoy extended periods of stability or equilibrium that are
punctuated by occasional crises resulting in institutional change, after which institutions
return to a state of equilibrium (Steinmo et al., 1992, p. 15).
In contrast to the punctuated equilibrium model, historical institutionalism posits
a model of institutional change characterized by institutional dynamism or the dynamic,
rather than static, nature of organizations and how institutional dynamics either reinforce
or gradually change institutions. (Steinmo et al., 1992, p. 16). Ikenberry (1994) noted that
the historical institutional approach to path dependency is a “critical junctures and
developmental pathways” (p. 16) approach, which holds that basic institutional logic is
set during critical moments. The approach holds that future changes tend to be further
developments or extensions of what was set in those crucial moments, rather than
departures from them. In considering institutional dynamics, historical institutionalism
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looks both at mechanisms that maintain institutional trajectories and those that result in
institutional changes.
Fundamental mechanisms that maintain institutional trajectories, or those that
result in further development or extensions of those paths set during previous critical
moments, include positive feedback, increasing returns, and sunk costs (Fioretos, 2011, p.
374; Thelen, 1999). Positive feedback most often consists of the generation of positive
external collaborators, supporters, and networks resulting from a position or choice
(Fioretos, 2011, p. 377). Positive feedback can also result from an individual using their
institutional authority to create institutional rules that strengthen their positions of power
(Sorensen, 2015, p. 23). Increasing returns refers to the initial benefits that an institution
receives from taking a position (positive feedback) and how they benefit from
maintaining that position increases over time when compared to alternative positions
(Fioretos, 2011). Although alternative positions may have, at one time, been equally
beneficial to the institution as the chosen position, over time, the chosen position’s
benefits become increasingly helpful when compared to the benefits the institution would
gain from changing positions. Sunk costs refer to the idea that individuals within
institutions must weigh the costs and benefits of change against “maintaining or losing
their investments in past arrangements” (Fioretos, 2011, p. 373). Individuals who hold
positions of power within institutions may owe their current positions to those who came
before them in the movement, the movement’s founder, or another institutional leader or
may owe their position of power to historical choices the institution made to follow
specific ideational positions.

25
Contrary to the punctuated equilibrium model, historical institutionalism focuses
on gradual institutional change. Historical institutionalism holds that most institutional
change happens gradually over time, rather than in through radical change. However,
radical change is not considered impossible within a historical institutionalist framework
(Fioretos, 2011; Sorensen, 2015). Fioretos (2011, p. 347) identified four sources of this
incremental change: layering, drift, conversion, and displacement. Layering involves
creating a new policy without eliminating an old policy (Sorensen, 2015, p. 30). Where
eliminating an old policy or practice may prove controversial and create conflict within
an institution, layering a new policy over an old policy can create gradual change without
disrupting institutional relationships. Drift refers to the transformation of an otherwise
stable policy as a result of changing circumstances (Sorensen, 2015, p. 30). As exogenous
changes occur, institutions may shift or drift in a position to adapt to new conditions
(Steinmo et al., 1992, p. 17). Conversion refers to internal policy adaptations through the
way they are implemented (Sorensen, 2015, p. 30). Rather than changes to the policy or
position itself, conversion concerns changes in implementation, which may, over time,
result in changes in outcomes. Displacement refers to the rescission and replacement of
existing institutional policy (Sorensen, 2015, p. 30). Whereas layering creates a new
policy without eliminating the previous policy, displacement represents a formal
replacement of an existing policy or position with a new one.
In considering radical changes to institutions, historical institutionalism holds that
such changes can happen one of two ways. First, radical change can result from the
accumulation of gradual changes that have occurred over time (Fioretos, 2011; Sorensen,
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2015). Indeed, historical institutionalism holds that the accumulation of incremental
changes represents the most common cause for radical institutional reforms. Radical
change can, however, also occur from “exogenous shocks” (Fioretos, 2011, p. 374). Such
external shocks are like the punctuations identified in punctuated equilibrium theory.
However, historical institutionalism does not hold that such shocks are necessary for
institutional change, nor are they the most common cause of institutional change.
This study was concerned with the effect of the political party affiliation of the
president with refugee admissions to the United States, along with any moderating effect
had by the political party affiliations of the Senate and House. Steinmo et al. (1992)
identified political parties as institutions in their seminal work on historical
institutionalism. By examining the effect of political party affiliation on refugee
admissions to the United States, this study identified whether the sharp reductions in
refugee admissions under the Trump administration are the result of accumulated
incremental changes toward refugee reductions by the Republican Party or represent an
exogenous shock to Republican positions on refugee resettlement in the United States.
Literature Review
History of U.S. Refugee Resettlement Until 1980
Refugees are one type of immigrant, so understanding current refugee policy and
the policies that led to the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 requires an understanding
of broader U.S. immigration laws. Control over immigration is generally considered to be
one of the few “universal attributes” (p. 21) of national sovereignty (Teitelbaum, 1980).
Until Chae Chan Ping v. United States (1889), which established that immigration
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regulation was a federal responsibility, U.S. immigration policy was a patchwork of state
and federal laws (Steil & Vasi, 2014, p. 1108).
Before WWII, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, immigration policies were
based on employer demands for labor and nation-building, with a focus on maintaining
national homogeneity be implementing restrictions on nations of origin (Akbari &
MacDonald, 2014, p. 805; Triadafilopoulos, 2010, p. 169). Among the most well-known
immigration acts of this time is the Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), which was passed in
reaction to Chinese immigration to California and the U.S. West Coast to work as
laborers (Zolberg, 1988). Hutchinson (1981) noted that beginning in the 1880s, Congress
provided for the admission of immigrants who would otherwise have been excluded, if
they were seeking to immigrate to the United States “to avoid persecution or punishment
on religious or political grounds” (as cited in Zolberg, 1988, p. 653). Although these
exemptions permitted admittance of those who would otherwise have been excluded
based on factors such as illiteracy or ability to be economically self-sufficient, such
admissions were still governed by existing quotas that restricted immigration by national
origin. These national origin quotas benefited many Eastern European Jews and
Armenian Christians while continuing to exclude groups such as the Chinese (Zolberg,
1988). Under these exemptions, more than 2 million Eastern European Jews were
admitted to the United States between 1881 and 1914 (Zolberg, 1988, p. 654).
The next major attempt to address special groups of immigrants fleeing
persecution was the Act to Regulate the Admission of Aliens to and the Residence of
Aliens in the United States (1917), also known as the Immigration Act of 1917, which
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was vetoed by President Woodrow Wilson, a Democrat, due to his opposition to the law’s
literacy requirement and based on his belief that an exemption for those fleeing
persecution would require the United States to pass judgment on other governments
(Martin & Ferris, 2017, p. 19). Seven years later, the Act to Limit the Immigration of
Aliens into the United States (1924), also known as the Immigration Act of 1924,
supplanted prior immigration acts and effectively banned Asian and African immigration
to the United States, while putting significant limitations on Eastern European
immigration (Fussell, 2014). The act remained in place until after WWII. Millions of
people were displaced across Europe following WWII, having fled political, religious,
and ethnic persecution (Brown & Scribner, 2014). Despite the displaced millions, opinion
was mixed about accepting Jewish refugees into the United States. Members of Congress
feared that Nazi spies could be among those claiming to be Jewish refugees, and to accept
them would be to put the United States in danger (Welch, 2014). Although Roosevelt
supporters were more likely to support allowing Jewish refugees to be admitted to the
United States, only 23% of Americans supported raising quotas to allow for more Jewish
refugees and immigrants to enter the country (Welch, 2014, pp. 627-628).
In response to the refugee crisis in Europe, President Harry Truman, a Democrat,
advocated in 1946 for the United States to admit refugees fleeing communist regimes.
Truman was opposed by Senator Chapman Revercomb (R-WV), who stated his belief
that the United States should not accept anyone from communist countries, as they would
bring with them their communist ways of thinking and negatively influence the American
people (Scribner, 2017, p. 268). Despite such opposition, the Displaced Persons Act
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(1948) passed with Truman in office, which allowed for the admission of 200,000
Eastern European refugees into the United States. Although not increasing the number of
available visas for immigrants, the Displaced Persons Act was the first legislative act that
specifically addressed refugee immigration (Martin & Ferris, 2017, p. 20).
After the Displaced Persons Act expired in 1952, Congress passed the Refugee
Relief Act (1953), which was signed into law by President Dwight Eisenhower, a
Republican (Martin & Ferris, 2017). The Refugee Relief Act specifically allowed for the
admission of individuals who entered displaced persons camps after 1945, and such
entries were in addition to, rather than subject to, existing national origin quotas (Martin
& Ferris, 2017, p. 20). Eisenhower went on to approve the admission of an additional
38,000 Hungarian refugees between late 1956 and May 1957 who had been displaced by
the Hungarian uprising of 1956 (Brown & Scribner, 2014; Martin & Ferris, 2017). 1957
saw the passage of the Refugee-Escapee Act (1957), which allowed for admission to the
United States of those who had escaped a communist or Middle Eastern country fleeing
persecution for racial, religious, or political reasons (Martin & Ferris, 2017, p. 20). This
ad hoc approach to addressing refugee needs continued under the presidency of John
Kennedy, a Democrat, who admitted 100,000 Cuban refugees between January 1959–
December 1960, which led to the establishment of the Migration and Refugee Assistance
Act (1962) to fund support for refugees, mainly Cuban nationals living in Miami, Florida
(Brown & Scribner, 2014).
The passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act (1965) (INA) under President
Lyndon Johnson, a Democrat, marked a departure for U.S. immigration laws that had
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been based on national origin quotas. The INA replaced national origin quotas with a
focus on family reunification and skilled immigrants that have remained focuses of the
U.S. immigration system (Drometer & Méango, 2017). Despite removing national origin
quotas, the INA continued to favor European immigrants while limiting immigration
from Asia, Africa, and Latin America, giving particular preference to immigrants
Western and Northern European countries (Barkdull et al., 2012; Fussell, 2014). The INA
reserved 6% of visas for refugees. Still, it did not establish a formal refugee admissions
process nor align the definition of refugee with the refugee definition established by the
United Nations 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) (Tichenor,
2016, p. 691), to which the United States declined to be a party.
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was focused,
specifically, on addressing the needs of European refugees who had been displaced “as a
result of events occurring before 1 January 1951”. When the United Nations met in 1967,
the Protocols Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967) was issued and expended
protections by eliminating geographic and time limitations (Brown & Scribner, 2014).
Although the United States ratified the Protocol in 1968 (Fitzpatrick, 1997), refugee
admissions continued on an ad hoc basis through emergency legislations such as the
Indochina Migration and Refugee Assistance Act (1975) after the fall of Saigon under
president Gerald Ford, a Republican, that admitted 130,000 refugees from Cambodia,
Laos, and Vietnam (Brown & Scribner, 2014) and the admission of 640,000 Cubans
following the Communist Revolution in 1979 under president Jimmy Carter, a Democrat
(Kerwin, 2018).
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The Refugee Act of 1980 and the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
By the end of the 1970s, as many as 14,000 Southeast Asian refugees affected by
the Vietnam War were arriving in the United States each month (Gonzalez Benson,
2016). In response, Congress held hearings in 1979 to examine how to best address this
spike in admissions (Gonzalez Benson, 2016). Senator Dick Clark (D-IA), who had been
appointed to be the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, in his testimony before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated the need for “permanent and consistent refugee
policy” (Brown & Scribner, 2014, p. 104) to replace the ad hoc responses to various
refugee crises (Brown & Scribner, 2014, p. 104). The Refugee Act of 1980 was first
introduced as S. 643 by Edward Kennedy (D-MA), and, after passing the Senate,
Elizabeth Holtzman (D-NY) and Peter Rodina (D-NJ) sponsored the same as HR 2816. In
testimony before the House, proponents of the Act argued that it would give Congress
“greater and more explicit power than it has had before with regard to the numbers and
nature of refugees to be admitted to this country” (H.R. Rep. No. 69-2, at 4500 (1980)).
The Act passed the House with 63% of Democrats voting in favor and 72% of
Republicans voting against the Act (GovTrack, n.d.), and was signed into law by
President Jimmy Carter.
Despite passing through a Democratically controlled Congress and being signed
into law by a Democratic president, the Refugee Act was not without detractors. Echoing
Revercomb’s objections to admitting communists in 1946, opponents of the Refugee Act
also expressed concerns that admitting refugees from the Soviet Union under the Refugee
Act would admit communists who could undermine the United States from within
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(Scribner, 2017, p. 268). Other opponents worried that the Refugee Act would undermine
existing immigration policies that favored Europeans (Scribner, 2017, p. 268). These
concerns were not limited to politicians. A 1980 national poll indicated that only 19% of
U.S. respondents wanted to expand refugee admissions to Indochinese refugees
(Teitelbaum 1980, p. 21).
Concerns about moving away from European-favoring policies were not
unfounded. The Refugee Act represented a move toward non-discriminative immigration
policies and into alignment with the 1967 Protocols (Brown & Scribner, 2014;
Teitelbaum, 1980). These were not the primary focus of the Refugee Act, however,
which was to establish uniform refugee admissions and assistance procedures through the
establishment of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (Barkdull et al., 2012; Brown &
Scribner, 2014; Congressional Digest, 2016; Vialet, 1999).
While the Senate and House Judiciary Committees have primary responsibility for
and jurisdiction over immigration issues (Fennelly et al., 2015), the Refugee Act
delegates to the Executive Branch the annual refugee admissions ceiling and regional
allocations, based mainly on the administration’s belief about strategic benefits of
resettlement of specific populations (Berman, 2011). U.S. geography and the USRAP’s
overseas refugee admissions processing allows the administration to choose the
nationalities, ethnicities, and other qualities of refugees to be admitted (Berman, 2011).
The president’s administration is required to submit a report to the Senate and House
Judiciary Committees outlining the intended ceiling and regional allocations (Bruno,
2015), then cabinet-level representatives meet in-person with representatives from the
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Judiciary Committees to discuss the administration’s report before the president issues
the annual presidential determination finalizing the ceiling and regional allocations
(Bruno, 2015). Despite the legislative history of the Refugee Act making clear that
Congress intended to maintain active participation in refugee admissions (Harvard
Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program, 2018), the Refugee Act does not require
congressional approval of the ceiling or regional allocations, but only requires that
cabinet-level members of the administration consult with Congress (Congressional
Digest, 2016, p. 5).
While the presidential determination sets the total admissions ceiling at the start
of each fiscal year, these have been periodically modified in acknowledgement of
changing global realities. Changes to the admissions ceiling may be done by issuing a
new presidential determination or through executive order. In both FY88 and FY89,
annual ceilings were increased through presidential determination by 15,000 and 22,500,
respectively, to address the growing numbers of refugees from Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union (Determination No. 88-16, 53 Fed. Reg. 21405 (May 20, 1988);
Determination No. 89-15, 54 Fed. Reg. 31493 (June 19, 1989)). In FY99, the ceiling was
increased through presidential determination by 13,000 to accommodate Kosovar
refugees (Determination No. 99-33, 64 Fed. Ref. 47341 (Aug. 12, 1999)). The reduction
in the admissions ceiling under the Trump administration through Executive Orders Nos.
13,769 and 13,760 in FY17 represents the only instance in which the ceiling has been
lowered, rather than increased, mid-fiscal year. While regional allocations can be
modified, increases in regional allocations are generally resultant from using part or all of
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the unallocated reserve for the given fiscal year, rather than by presidential determination
(Bruno, 2015, p. 3).
The USRAP is not a single entity, but rather a collaboration of many agencies
including USCIS, part of the Department of Homeland Security; PRM, part of the
Department of State; and the Office of Refugee Resettlement, part of the Department of
Health and Human Services (Biddle, 2018). PRM works collaboratively with the
UNHCR and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to manage overseas
processing of refugees before their admission to the United States (Biddle, 2018). As of
2016, the United Nations estimated that there were 20 million refugees globally, not
including an additional 5 million Palestinians (Colloton, 2016). For each refugee, the
United Nations seeks one of three “durable solutions” (Brown & Scribner, 2014). The
first durable solution, voluntary repatriation, involves a refugee being able to return to
their country of nationality when there is no longer a threat of persecution (Brown &
Scribner, 2014). The second durable solution, local integration, involves a refugee being
able to remain safely in the country in which they currently reside, generally their country
of first asylum, after fleeing their country of nationality (Brown & Scribner, 2014). This
solution requires that the refugee be provided with valid access to socio-economic, legal,
civil, and human rights in that country (Brown & Scribner, 2014). The third option, thirdcountry resettlement, involving resettlement to a third country (other than the country of
nationality and the country of first asylum) is considered for those who are “in urgent
need of protection and [those] for whom other durable solutions are not feasible”
(Thomas-Greenfield, 2001, p. 165). Resettlement is the last UNHCR option and only
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available to less than 1% of refugees in the world (Lindsay, 2017), and the USRAP
represents the United States’ program for admitting such refugees.
Refugee admissions have fluctuated from a high of 159,252 in FY81 to a low of
22,491 in FY18 (International Rescue Committee, 2019b). Before FY18, the lowest
annual admissions number was in FY02, when 27,131 refugees were admitted in the
wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. (Nagel, 2016). While the
refugee populations (nationalities) admitted to the U.S. post-9/11 have changed, and new
security procedures have been implemented (Barkdull et al., 2012, p. 108), there has been
no significant legislation to address refugee resettlement in the U.S. since the Refugee
Act, mainly due to political polarization and inability to work ‘across the aisle’ (Magner,
2016, p. 187).
Partisanship in Immigration and Refugee Policy
While Americans have historically favored limited immigration (Fussell, 2014),
the link between partisanship and attitudes toward immigration policy has grown stronger
over time, as immigration has become an increasingly politicized issue. The winners of
the 2016 elections were among the most hostile toward immigrants in recent U.S. history,
according to studies by both Holoma and Tavits (2018) and Schmidt (2019). MelkonianHoover and Kellstedt noted that both the United States and Europe are experiencing
right-wing populist responses to immigration that frame immigrants as outsiders or
“others” (2019, p. 51).
Fears about immigrants have been a theme throughout U.S. history as new
immigrant groups would arrive, often presenting as right-wing populist responses (Jiang
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& Erez, 2018; Melkonian-Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019, p. 52). In the 1820s – 1850s,
German and Irish, particularly Irish Catholic, immigrants were the “others” that populist
movements opposed (Finley & Esposito, 2020, p. 181), including the Republican Party,
which opposed Irish Catholic immigration (Gratton, 2018, p. 131). Republican strategy
shifted in the 1860s to promoting immigration as they sought both to increase votes
among existing immigrant communities and to promote immigrant labor to employers in
need of laborers (p. 132). The increase in immigrant labor, however, proved to be
competition for U.S.-born laborers, and, in the 1880s, Republican strategy shifted again
to restricting immigration to garner working-class votes (p. 129).
From the 1890s through the 1920s, southern and eastern European immigrants
were the targets of “othering” in the United States. “Othering” did not occur only in U.S.born communities but was also seen in immigrant communities across the country.
Norwegian- and Swedish-language newspapers denounced immigration from southern
and eastern Europe in favor of immigration from northwestern Europe (p. 134). Other
immigrant communities, including German and Croatian speaking communities,
published news articles opposing restrictions on immigration from southern and eastern
Europe (p. 134). This “othering” of eastern Europeans remained through WWII when
Jews fleeing persecution by the Nazis were denied entry into the United States, and
quotas limiting eastern European immigration remained in place (Welch, 2014).
The passage of the INA in 1965 marked not only a break from a focus on national
origin quotas in immigration policy but also the deepening of party divides on
immigration. Elimination of quotas that were intended to increase western and northern
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European immigration to the United States was closely tied to the broader U.S. Civil
Rights Movement, which framed the INA’s reforms as liberal (Tsai, 2019). When
President Reagan framed immigration as an economic issue in the 1980s, however, the
majority of Republican senators supported the admission of immigrants (Jeong et al.,
2011, p. 514). Reagan argued:
Rather than putting up a fence, why don’t we…make it possible for them to come
here legally with a work permit and, then, while they’re working here and earning
here, they pay taxes here. (Johnson, 2018, p. 15)
Jeong et al. argue that this Republican support was borne out of a Republican Party
dominated by economic conservatives rather than social conservatives (2011, p. 524). It
was this economically conservative Republican Party that passed the Immigration
Reform and Control (1986) (IRCA), which granted amnesty to undocumented
immigrants present before January 1, 1982, and who had been continuously present in the
United States since that time, approximately three million people (Jeong et al., 2011, p.
517). The IRCA provided a means to authorize workers through amnesty while also
requiring employers to hire only work-authorized employees (p. 517).
Between the 1980s and the 2010s, the Republican Party became increasingly
dominated by social conservatives rather than by economic conservatives (Jeong et al.,
2011, p. 524). In 1990, Congress passed and President George H. W. Bush signed into
law the Immigration Act of 1990 (1990), which increased overall immigration up to
700,000 per year for 1992-1994, then 675,000 per year thereafter, created five
employment-based visas by occupation, created a diversity lottery program to admit
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nationals from countries with limited immigration to the United States, created
Temporary Protected Status, created a family-based visa program, and reduced the
number of relative visas available to temporary workers (Johnson, 2018, pp. 15-16). By
comparison, when the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (1996) was before Congress, social conservatives in the Republican Party proposed
amendments to reduce family-based and work-based immigration (Jeong et al., p. 519).
Because pro-business, economic conservatives in the Republican Party opposed the
amendments, however, they did not pass (p. 519).
Polarization on immigration policy maintained a low profile in national politics
throughout the 1990s (Nagel, 2016). Yet, congressional votes on immigration-related
measures were the most polarizing of all issues voted on from the early 1990s through the
mid-2010s (Fennelly et al., 2015). Citing Citrin and colleagues in studies from 1990,
1997, and 2009, Fussell (2014) noted that Republicans consistently preferred
restrictionist immigration policies, while Democrats consistently favored more
expansionist policies (p. 487). In reviewing Senate races from 2010, 2012, and 2014,
Reny found that Republican candidates were more likely than Democratic candidates to
make anti-immigrant appeals to gain support (2017, p. 736). Additionally, Reny found
that Republicans in states with increasing immigrant populations were more likely to
make anti-immigrant appeals that those in states with low immigrant populations.
However, this increase was moderated by the size of the voting-eligible immigrant
population in the candidate’s state (p. 743). While Democratic voters were shown to be
more likely to support expansionist immigration policies if their community had a large

39
immigrant population (Hawley, 2011), immigrant population growth had no effect on
Democratic Senate candidates making pro-immigrant appeals in Reny’s study (2017, p.
742).
The terrorist attacks in New York City on September 11, 2001, had a profound
impact on American politics. Following the “9/11 attacks”, Muslims and others of Middle
Eastern descent became the “other” of concern in the United States, facing increased
scrutiny, particularly for immigrants and refugees (Barkdull et al., 2012; Disney, 2017).
The 9/11 attacks also allowed socially conservative Republicans to argue that immigrants
and refugees were a security threat, to take stronger anti-immigration positions, and move
the party closer to positions that were contrary to the pro-business, economically
conservative positions of 1986 and 1996 (Jeong et al., 2011, p. 519).
The civil war in Syria led to the highest level of refugees in recorded history in
2015 (Walden et al., 2017). With the influx of refugees and immigrants from Syria into
Europe, the Obama administration announced that it would accept ten thousand Syrian
refugees into the United States through the USRAP. Republicans quickly expressed
opposition to Syrian refugee resettlement following the November 2015 terrorist attack in
Paris, with opposition to Syrian refugees used by Republican presidential primary
candidates in 2016 to “establish their anti-Muslim, pro-national security, pro-border
control bona fides” (Nagel, 2016, p. 285). Despite fears following the Paris terrorist
attack, which was later found not to have been committed by refugees, Democratic voters
remained united on pro-immigration and pro-refugee issues (Noel, 2016, p. 174). By the
2016 campaign, Bartles (2018) found that Republicans were united around social and
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cultural conservatism, with little consideration for the economic conservatism that
previously defined the party, and Democrats were primarily united around an “activist
government” while being divided on cultural issues (2018, p. 1483).
Refugee Policy and the Trump Administration
Restrictions on immigration in general, as well as on refugees specifically,
became central to Trump’s campaign, even before he secured the Republican nomination
(Scribner, 2017, p. 263). Muslim immigrants and refugees, in particular, were highlighted
as threats to the United States, according to Trump, who also linked immigration to
criminals and refugees to “terrorists-in-waiting” (Scribner, 2017, p. 265, 327). During his
campaign as well as after taking office, Trump pointed to refugees as threats to national
security (Ferwerda et al., 2017), while also arguing that the country could not absorb
more refugees and that refugees were unwilling to assimilate into American culture.
(Kerwin, 2018). Trump’s opposition to the USRAP, however, is part of a broader
opposition to immigration (Kerwin, 2018), as demonstrated by orders issued early in his
administration.
One week after taking office, Trump issued his first executive order impacting the
USRAP. Executive Order No. 13,769, commonly referred to as “the Muslim ban”
(Ferwerda et al., 2017; Fullerton, 2017), on January 27, 2017, banned entry into the
United States of all citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries for 90 days,
suspended all refugee resettlement for 120 days, suspended Syrian refugee resettlement
indefinitely, reduced the FY17 admissions ceiling from 110,000 to 50,000, and stated that
the USRAP would give preference to religious minorities once refugee resettlement
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resumed (Executive Order No. 13,769). The Trump administration based its authority to
issue the executive order on § 212(f) of the INA which reads, in part:
Whenever the president finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens
into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States,
may by proclamation, and for such a period as he shall deem necessary, suspend
the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or
impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate
(Immigration and Nationality Act § 212 (f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) (2012)).
More than 50 legal challenges were filed against Executive Order No. 13,769 (Scribner,
2017, p. 266), with multiple temporary restraining orders issued by January 28, 2017, and
a nationwide temporary restraining order issued on January 30, 2017, in State of
Washington v. Trump (2017). With the nationwide restraining order in place, refugees,
including Syrian refugees, continued to be resettled in the United States over the next five
weeks (Fullerton, 2017).
On March 6, 2017, Trump rescinded Executive Order No. 13,769 and issued
Executive Order No. 13,780 in its place. Similar to the order that it replaced, Executive
Order No. 13,780, commonly referred to as “the Muslim ban 2.0” (Fullerton, 2017),
suspended refugee resettlement for 120 days, suspended all entry from six Muslimmajority countries for 90 days, and lowered the admissions ceiling from 110,000 to
50,000 (Executive Order No. 13,780, 2017). Like Executive Order No. 13,769 before it,
more than 50 lawsuits were filed against Executive Order No. 13,780 (Fullerton, 2017),
and like the previous order, a temporary restraining order was issued against Executive
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Order No. 13,780, this time in the case of International Refugee Assistance Project v.
Trump (2017). The Trump administration appealed the International Refugee Assistance
Project (IRAP) decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which upheld the lower
court’s decision. The Trump administration, again, appealed the decision. The Supreme
Court issued an unsigned per curiam opinion on June 26, 2017 in Trump v. International
Refugee Assistance Project, et al. (2017), allowing many of the provisions of Executive
Order No. 13,780 to move forward, including the 120-day ban on refugee admissions to
the U.S., excepting those refugees with close family connections in the United States who
were allowed entry during those 120 days. This 120-day suspension of most refugee
admissions through the USRAP lasted into the following fiscal year. For FY18, the
admissions ceiling was set by the Trump administration at 45,000 the lowest refugee
admissions ceiling since the passage of the Refugee Act (International Rescue
Committee, 2017). In FY19, the admissions ceiling was lower, still, set at 30,000
(International Rescue Committee, 2019b, p. 1). The UNHCR would go on to report that
2019 set new records of refugees worldwide (UNHCR, 2021b).
Factors Affecting Partisanship and Refugee/Immigration Policy
As recently as 2014, the literature on immigration policy held that “[i]mmigration
policy is not generally viewed as the nation’s most important problem” (Hajnal & Rivera,
2014, p. 775). By 2018, however, a Gallop Poll showed that “immigration” tied with
“dissatisfaction with government” as the “most important problem facing the country” for
Republicans (Reinhart, 2018). Strong opposition to refugee admissions and immigration
was central to the Trump campaign in 2016, with support for Trump showing substantial
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increases among those with anti-immigrant attitudes (Lachman, 2019; Manza & Crowley,
2018, p. 32; Sides et al., 2018). Trump framed immigrants and refugees as the other
preventing America from being “great” (Young, 2017, p. 218). This echoed populist
campaigns in Europe that focused on a “glorious past” and the uncertainty of the future to
other immigrants and gained support among voters (Saldaña et al., 2018, p. 793). While
Republican lawmakers and members of the Republican political elite opposed Trump
(Sides et al., 2018), at least during the presidential primary, Johnson (2018) argued that
he generally reflected the existing opinions among rank file Republican voters (p. 16).
Many scholars have noted the increasing partisanship and polarization in U.S.
politics (Drometer & Méango, 2017; Fennelly et al., 2015; Fussell, 2014; Kaufmann et
al., 2012). Not only do political parties shape the opinions of the public, often functioning
as “aggregators” of political and policy information (Pearson-Merkowitz et al., 2015, p.
313), but public attitudes also shape the behavior of policymakers (Adida et al., 2019).
While party preferences affect the public’s attitudes towards immigration, so too does the
attitude of the native-born public affect the party’s responses to immigration (Homola &
Tavits, 2018).
Given the impact of the public’s opinion on party positions, it is relevant to
review the literature examining reasons why individuals voted for Trump and how these
reasons fit within the party’s history. Themes in the literature explanation voting for
Trump include populism, Islamophobia, economic grievances, and racism/ethnocentricity
with particular attention to White Evangelical voters (Gest et al., 2018; Kaufmann et al.,
2012; Tsai, 2019; Tucker et al, 2019; Whitehead et al., 2018). Populism is always against
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something (Biegon, 2019, p. 520), and Trump’s populism often frames the people against
immigrants as their adversaries. Magcamit (2017) argues that Trump was elected by
“people who felt that they had become strangers in their own land” (p. 16) who were not
able to achieve the American dream and often found immigrants to be the reason
(Magcamit, 2017).
Islamophobia
For some Americans, Muslim refugees and immigrants to the United States pose
economic, security, and cultural threats (Breshnahan et al., 2018, p. 564). In September
2015, the world woke up to images of a Syrian toddler who had washed ashore a beach in
Turkey after drowning in the Mediterranean as his family was fleeing war (Richard,
2019). Shortly after, Obama announced his intention to increase the admission of Syrian
refugees, only to have public support waiver following the terrorist attack in Paris in
November 2015 (Nagel, 2016). The Trump campaign capitalized on the fear generated by
the Paris attack the stoke negative attitudes toward refugees and immigrants (Saldaña,
2018, p. 793).
During the campaign, Trump suggested creating a database to track Muslims in
the United States., banning all foreign Muslims from entering the United States, and
characterized Muslims as likely to commit acts of terror (Doucerain et al., 2018, p. 225;
Magcamit, 2017, p. 18). Trump was not alone in this framing of Muslim refugees.
Candidate Ben Carson referred to Syrian refugees as “rabid dogs” while Trump referred
to them as “Trojan horses” for terrorism (Kteily & Bruneau, 2017, p. 87). Trump would
make similar statements later, when he referred to “unknown Middle Easterners”
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traveling as part of an immigrant caravan from Central America to the southern border of
the U.S. (Béland, 2020, p. 171). These statements echo WWII-era concerns that Nazis or
Nazi supporters may be hiding among Jewish refugee groups and Cold War-era concerns
that communists may be hiding among those fleeing persecution in communist countries.
Multiple studies conducted in 2016 and 2017 showed that Republicans,
conservatives, and Trump-supporters were significantly less likely to support Syrian
refugees than other U.S. adults (Newman, 2018, p. 776). Having a Republican voting
record has also been associated with support for policies hostile toward Muslim
immigrants, including support for reducing the number of Syrian refugees admitted to the
U.S. (Doucerain et al., 2018, p. 235). Following Trump’s efforts to restrict refugees from
the Middle East and prioritize Christian refugees (Schmidt, 2019), one poll showed that
73% of Republicans agreed that “banning people from Muslim countries is necessary to
prevent terrorism,” while only 19% of Democrats agreed (p. 225). While anti-Muslim
bias is significantly lower among Democrats, non-Whites, and non-Christians,
Americans, overall, preferred Syrian refugees who are female, high-skilled, Englishspeaking, and Christian (Adida et al., 2019).
Economic Anxiety
One theory for Trump’s success is that his economic rhetoric gained support
among economically struggling segments of the public (Manza & Crowley, 2018). Gest
et al. have shown that support for Trump among Republicans is related to perceived
economic deprivation compared to others (2018, p. 1710). Trump frames immigrants as
taking jobs from U.S.-born workers and lowering overall wages (Finley & Esposito,
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2020; Magcamit, 2017). While immigrants and U.S.-born Americans tend to compete for
different low-skilled jobs rather than the same low-skilled jobs (Finley & Esposito, 2020,
p. 190), a sense of powerlessness amid economic struggles has led working-class and
low-skilled workers to support Trump (Gest et al., 2018, p. 1697).
This sense of powerlessness has led not only to support for Trump among
Republican voters but has also led many working-class Whites to leave the Democratic
Party (Gest et al., 2018). Continued upward economic mobility and the protections
provided by union membership were once core to White working-class support of the
Democratic Party (Reny et al., 2019, p. 97). Losses in the U.S. manufacturing sector have
disproportionately impacted middle class and low-skilled workers (Gest et al., 2018),
stunting upward mobility and reducing union membership (Reny et al.), and these losses
have led many working-class Whites to leave the Democratic Party and support Trump
(p. 1697). Economic concerns, along with racial matters, led to vote switching in 2016,
comparable to the Southern realignment following the Civil Rights Movement (Reny et
al., 2019, p. 109).
Racism and Ethnocentricity
An alternative view is that Trump was able to galvanize existing racist and antiimmigrant sentiments to his advantage in the campaign (Manza & Crowley, 2018, p. 29).
Analysis by Sides et al. showed that dominant factors in supporting Trump included
concerns about liberalism and “racial and ethnic out-groups,” but not economic concerns
(2018, p. 148). Concerns about liberalism were also found to be less significant than fears
of “racial and ethnic out-groups” (p. 148). This may be because many White Americans
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view race, and by extension immigration, as a “zero-sum” scenario in which gains for any
one group mean losses for another group (Wilkins & Kaiser, as cited in Major et al.,
2018, p. 932).
Trump tapped into this anti-immigrant sentiment and into bias against racial,
ethnic, and religious minorities groups, using “us versus them” rhetoric that resulted in
“othering” immigrant groups and playing to fears that White Americans will lose to
immigrants (Breshnahan et al., 2018; Disney, 2017; Heyer, 2018). Multiple studies have
drawn connections between attitudes toward immigrants and refugees and predispositions
to ethnocentrism and prejudice (Hajnal & Rivera, 2014, p. 775). Among those most likely
to respond to ethnic or racial appeals from candidates or lawmakers in the United States
are Republicans (Sides et al., 2018, p. 137).
Shifts in the racial makeup of the United States and shifts toward more significant
percentages of the U.S. population being immigrants have been used in political rhetoric
to play into anxieties about American cultural identity and White dominance in American
culture (Gest et al., 2018, p. 1697; Jiang & Erez, 2018, p. 9). Studies in Europe have
shown a direct link between the size of a country’s immigrant population and support in
that country for right-wing parties (Hajnal & Rivera, 2014, p. 774). Over the past halfcentury, the United States has become increasingly diverse, with Latinx immigrants
representing the largest minority group in the country. In contrast, the White population
has fallen from around 90% to 65% of the U.S. population (p. 773). During those same
years, the U.S. immigrant population grew from 9.7 million in 1960, representing 5.4%
of the U.S. population, to 44.4 million in 2017, representing 13.6% of the population
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(Radford & Noe-Bustamante, 2019). Immigrants as a percentage of the U.S. population
was at its lowest in the 1960s-1970s, however (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.). From the
1860s through the 1920s, the immigrant population fluctuated between 13.2% and 14.8%
of the overall U.S. population, only to drop between the 1930s and 1970s before
increasing again in the 1980s (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.; Young, 2017, p. 219). Hajnal &
Rivera (2014) argued that large-scale immigration has partisan consequences for Whites
in America, and partisan choices are linked to racial attitudes in the United States (p.
774).
Manza and Crowley (2018) noted that the partisan ethnonationalism seen in the
2016 presidential campaign is reminiscent of the southern White response to the
Democratic Party in the 1960s (p. 30). Those who did not believe that they benefited
from the liberal policies of the Civil Rights Act (1964) or the changes to immigration
quotas reacted negatively to the “others” who they perceived to be receiving benefits that
they did not, including ethnic and religious minorities, women, immigrants, and refugees
(Magcamit, 2017, p. 16). After the passage of the Civil Rights Act, southern Democrats
for whom race was an important issue left the Democratic Party and joined the
Republican conservatives (Jeong, et at., 2011, p. 513). This “southern realignment” (Hill,
& Tausanovich, 2018), or large-scale movement from affiliation with the Democratic
Party to the Republican Party, increased the number of social conservatives among
Republicans. Growing numbers of Republican caucuses passed from business
conservatives to social conservatives between the 1960s and the 2000s (Jeong et al.,
2011, p. 513).
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According to Post (2017), the Republican Party has been mostly White, middleclass, suburban, and professional since the 1960s (p. 100). During the 2016 election
cycle, however, this capitalist group was replaced by a what Post called a “radical, rightwing, middle-class insurgency” (2017, p. 100). Reny et al. argued that this was not only
working-class White voters but also non-working-class White voters who switched their
votes to the Republican Party in 2017 based on racial and immigration-related positions
(2019, p. 92). While party-switching has been closely associated with views on
immigration policy (Melkonian-Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019, p. 60), evidence also shows
that White Americans view the Democratic Party as a party of and for minorities, while
seeing the Republican Party as a party for Whites (Reny et al., 2019, p. 95).
By the 2016 election, the Democratic Party was seen by many Republicans as a
means for non-Whites (minorities, immigrants, refugees, etc.) to “jump the line” over
White Americans (Hochschild, 2016, as cited in Manza & Crowley, 2018, p. 30). Factors
affecting how the Democratic Party is seen include the growing Latinx support, the
public face of elected minority and Latinx representatives, the majority of whom are
Democrats, and the decreasing proportion of the Democratic Party made up for White
Americans (Hajnal & Rivera, 2014, pp. 715-716). Obama’s election was also significant,
in that the Democratic Party had not only pushed for civil rights for minorities during the
Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s but had also seen a Black man elected to the
presidency (Reny et al., 2019, p. 94). In all, studies have shown a stronger relationship
between vote switching to Trump and measures of racial and immigration attitudes than
with economic fears (p. 108).
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White Evangelicalism
In the United States, political party affiliation is associated with one’s church,
denomination, and place of residence (Kaufmann et al., 2012, p. 54). White Evangelical
to Republican Party affiliation in 2011 was 2:1 and had risen to 4:1 by 2018 (MelkonianHoover & Kellstedt, 2019, p. 60). While views on immigration are shaped by multiple
factors, not only religion or theology, Whites affiliated with Evangelical churches were
found to have the most conservative positions on immigration policy than any other U.S.
ethnoreligious group (Melkonian-Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019, pp. 50-51). Disney (2017)
noted that this may be because they are less likely to be immigrants themselves or to have
parents who are immigrants; 73% of U.S. Evangelicals have an immigration status of a
third-generation or higher (p. 69).
The idea of Christian nationalism also affects political affiliations in the United
States. Studies of American identity have shown strong associations between being
American and being White and Christian (Heyer, 2018, pp. 153-154). Christian
nationalism is the belief that the United States was founded as a Christian nation (BarrettFox, 2018). This belief has led to a tradition among many conservative Evangelicals that
White Christians built the United States and that immigrants are outsiders or even
enemies of this tradition (Whitehead et al., 2018, p. 146). For many right-wing
Evangelical Christians, there is also a belief that the United States is abandoning its
Christian heritage, making it vulnerable to losing the special blessings and protection that
God has granted the country (Barrett-Fox, 2018, p. 506). One study by Whitehead et al.
(2018) pointed to the belief that the United States is a Christian nation and belief in
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Christian nationalism as a basis for supporting Trump (p. 148), as Trump promised to
protect the country’s Christian heritage (Barrett-Fox, 2018, p. 518).
While Evangelicals are often portrayed solely as a right-wing group, there is, in
fact, a diverse range of beliefs among Evangelicals, ranging from what MelkonianHoover and Kellstedt (2019) referred to as “right-wing populist” to “liberal
internationalist” (p. 50). Right-wing populist Evangelicals have had long-standing
nationalist worries related to national security and racial and cultural shifts in the United
States. In contrast, liberal internationalists have had a focus on global missions and
development, addressing issues that include human trafficking, HIV/AIDS treatment,
refugee resettlement, and immigration reform (Melkonian-Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019, pp.
50-51, 52). This bifurcation in Evangelical beliefs can be seen going back to the 1800s
when conservative protestants pushed against increasing Catholic immigration and for
restrictions on immigration from China and other Asian countries (p. 52), while more
liberal protestants were among the prominent opponents to the passage of the Chinese
Exclusion Act and were active in advocating for its repeal (p. 52).
These different strains of Evangelical thought were again seen in 2015, early in
the presidential primary race, and when many Americans became aware of the Syrian
refugee crisis. Many religious leaders, including Evangelical religious leaders, made
faith-based arguments for bringing more Syrian refugees to the United States (Newman,
2018, p. 775). The National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) and World Relief, NAE’s
development organization, were outspoken proponents of increasing Syrian refugee
resettlement, as well as supporters of immigration, refugee resettlement, and
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comprehensive immigration reform (Melkonian-Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019, p. 56). In
2013, the NAE had founded the Evangelical Immigration Table (EIT) to support
comprehensive immigration reform, uniting immigrant families, ensuring safe borders,
and promoting comprehensive immigration reform at the federal level (MelkonianHoover & Kellstedt, 2019, p. 56). In a review of 59 U.S. Evangelical denominations, 17
signed onto the EIT, 14 did not sign but made positive or supportive statements about the
EIT, 28 did not comment the EIT, and no Evangelical denomination made negative
comments about the EIT (Melkonian-Hoover & Kellstedt, 2019, p. 55).
White Evangelical leaders in support of refugee resettlement and immigration
have been largely unsuccessful in winning over Evangelical laity. In 2016, only 31% of
White Evangelicals supported resettling Syrian refugees in the U.S., despite support
among Evangelical leaders (Newman, 2018, p. 776). Those with higher othering attitudes
towards refugees and Muslims are also more likely to identify as Christian (Disney, 2017,
pp. 68-69), and White Evangelicals are among the most anti-refugee groups in the U.S.
(Barrett-Fox, 2018, p. 508). Clergy have shown a limited ability to influence Evangelical
laity, who may be more influenced by peers, informal gatherings, or political affiliations
(Newman, 2018, p. 776).
Gaps in the Literature
There are several related gaps in the literature I addressed in this study. The first
gap is in presidential action versus Congressional action. Much of the literature addresses
legislation enacted by Congress, examining motivations for legislation, results of
legislation, and partisan voting records on immigration laws (Akbari & MacDonald,
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2014; Brown & Scribner, 2014; Fussell, 2014; Kerwin, 2018; Martin & Ferris, 2017;
Steil & Vasi, 2014; Teitelbaum, 1980; Triadafilopoulos, 2010; Welch, 2014; Zolberg,
1998). Refugee admissions to the United States, however, is based on presidential
determination, rather than on Congressional legislation. Although sources have reviewed
the Trump administration’s executive actions related to refugee admissions, these have
addressed executive orders (Breshnahan et al., 2018; Brown & Brown, 2017; Doucerain
et al., 2018; Fullerton, 2017; Gostin, 2017; Kerwin, 2018; Richard, 2019; Schmidt, 2019;
Scribner, 2017) with little attention to annual admissions determinations. The results of
this study show the effects of political party affiliation on the unique process of refugee
admissions determinations by presidents, rather than Congressional legislation or
executive orders.
A second gap in the literature is between political rhetoric on refugee policy and
the implications of that rhetoric on refugee admissions. Extant research discusses political
rhetoric, both by candidates and by elected officials, with particular attention to recent
election cycles (Fussell, 2014; Gratton, 2018; Homola & Tavits, 2018; MelkonianHoover & Kellstedt, 2019; Schmidt, 2019; Tsai, 2019). While attention is paid to
fulfilling campaign promises related to immigrant or refugee policy, specifically in the
case of Trump’s election in 2016, little attention has been paid to the relationship
between rhetoric and legislation on immigration policy. Even less attention has been
given to refugee policy or rhetoric’s impact on refugee admissions determinations.
Knowing that campaign and political rhetoric does not necessarily indicate policy choice
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(Callander & Wilkie, 2007; Panova, 2017), this study addressed this gap by looking
beyond rhetoric and promises to actual refugee admissions decisions.
As discussed by both Adida et al. (2019) and Homola and Tavits (2018), the
opinion of the electorate is as important as the positions of the political elite, as each
impact the other. While research has shown that politicians’ positions and behavior on
immigration policy (Homola & Tavits, 2018), researchers have not looked at refugeespecific policy, nor have they examined the impact of the public’s opinion on the
president’s annual refugee admissions determinations. The third gap is between the proor anti-refugee sentiment of voters on the actions on refugee admissions taken by the
politicians they elect to office. Although scholars have detailed the impact of voter
opinion on the policy positions taken by elected officials, this study looked at the actions
taken by elected officials once they have been elected to office.
The final gap in the literature I addressed in this study is the focus in recent
literature on the refugee policy and admissions decisions of the Trump administration
with little focus on the history of refugee admissions since the passage of the Refugee
Act in 1980. With Executive Order No. 13,769 (2017) used to lower the refugee
admissions ceiling in FY17 from 110,000 to 50,000, Trump took a dramatic step that
garnered significant attention (Ferwerda et al., 2017; Fullerton, 2017; Kerwin, 2018;
Scriber, 2017). Scholars looking at earlier refugee policy (Barkdull et al., 2012; Brown &
Scriber, 2014; Bruno, 2015; Fennelly et al., 2015; Gonzalez Benson, 2016; Magner,
2016; Scribner, 2017; Vialet, 1999) have largely focused on legislative policy, rather than
refugee admissions determinations. These studies have also failed to examine partisan
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trends in refugee admissions, leaving open the question of whether the current political
divisions related to refugee admissions are part of a historical partisan trend or an
anomaly under the current administration. This study examined the effect of partisan
affiliation on refugee admissions since the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, which
highlight trends by party affiliation and place the refugee admissions determinations of
the Trump administration within a broader historical context.
Summary and Conclusions
Refugees are a subset of the larger populations of immigrants; as such, partisan
positions on broad immigration policy, as well as specific refugee policy, are salient. Late
nineteenth and early twentieth-century immigration policy focused both on U.S. labor
needs and on maintaining cultural homogeneity (Akbari & MacDonald, 2014;
Triadafilopoulos, 2010). Congress began addressing immigration for those fleeing
persecution in the 1880s, although these provisions largely benefited European groups
while still excluding groups such as the Chinese (Zolberg, 1988). Following WWII,
Congress passed a series of measures to address the refugee crisis in Europe as well as
refugees from subsequent conflicts (Brown & Scribner, 2014; Gonzalez Benson, 2016;
Kerwin, 2018; Martin & Ferris, 2017; Scribner, 2017; Welch, 2014). The passage of the
Refugee Act of 1980 created a more comprehensive refugee admissions program,
replacing the patchwork of measures passed to address individual refugee crises (Brown
& Scribner, 2014) and aligning U.S. law with international law under the Protocols
Relating to the Status of Refugees in defining a “refugee” as an individual who is outside
their country of nationality, or for those without a nationality outside of their country of
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habitual residence, who is unable or unwilling to return to or to avail themselves of the
protection of that country due to a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of race,
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.
While Republican lawmakers have traditionally favored more restrictive
immigration policies and been more conservative on immigration, positions among
Democrats have also shifted over time (Johnson, 2018, p. 16; Pearson-Merkowitz et al.,
2015, p. 314). president George H. W. Bush, a Republican, was the president who
established temporary protected status, also known as TPS, for those fleeing natural
disasters or wars in their country of nationality until it was safe for them to return
(Lachman, 2019, p. 16). President Clinton, a Democrat, was the president signed the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, which made it easier for
the federal government to deport undocumented immigrants, even for minor offenses
(Johnson, 2018, p. 16). These examples demonstrate more moderate positions from both
Republican and Democratic presidents. Still, over the past quarter-century, party leaders
and lawmakers have become more distinct, polarized, as well more internally uniform
(Druckman et al., 2013, p. 57). Trump’s election in 2016 pushed Republican lawmakers
to more conservative positions on immigration that reflected the positions of the
Republican electorate (Johnson, 2018, p. 16).
This increased polarization among political elites has changed how the electorate
forms opinions, with voters relying more heavily on partisan positions than substantial
arguments (Druckman et al., 2013, p. 57). This has created a feedback loop of sorts, in
which the electorate is influencing the Republican Party toward more restrictive
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immigration positions while also getting information about immigration from Republican
elites. Despite that fact that little consideration has been given the differences in types of
immigrants (undocumented, refugees, asylum-seekers, etc.) in political rhetoric allowing
for limited in-depth discussion, party preferences remain strongly tied to their attitudes
toward immigration, with negative views toward immigration and immigrants among
conservative and right-wing voters (Homola & Tavits, 2018, p. 1749).
Trump’s campaign played up economic and cultural fears, particularly among
White Americans. Support for Trump has been tied to perceived economic deprivation, as
Trump framed immigrants as taking jobs from American workers while lowering wages
(Finley & Esposito, 2020; Magcamit, 2017; Manza & Crowley, 2018). These economic
fears overlap with cultural fears of a racially and ethnically changing nation, as both are
perceived as being related to downward mobility among White Americans (Manza &
Crowley, 2018, p. 31). Changes to immigration quotas in the 1960s were closely tied to
the broader Civil Rights Movement, which shifted immigration to the Unit from western
European immigrants to those from developing countries (Saldaña et al., 2018, p. 789;
Tsai, 2019, p. 528). Immigration served to tie together two groups supporting Trump –
those who feared cultural changes to the United States and those with economic anxieties
(Tsai, 2019, p. 538).
This study addressed multiple gaps in the literature. First, the literature focuses on
Congressional legislation, rather than on presidential actions. As refugee admissions are
determined by the president annually, presidential actions are particularly salient in
discussing refugee policy. Next, the literature addresses political rhetoric related to
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refugee policy, with particular attention to rhetoric during the 2016 presidential election
but provides limited insight into how that rhetoric translates into practice. The third gap is
in the influence of the electorate on legislators, which is discussed in multiple studies.
These studies, however, have not addressed the extent to which this influence has
extended to refugee admissions determinations. Lastly, there is a heavy focus on the
Trump administration’s refugee policy and admissions determinations, with little
attention to the historical trajectory of refugee admissions. This study focused on
presidential determination on refugee admissions while considering the moderating effect
of Congressional partisanship. It placed the Trump administration’s policy within a
broader framework of refugee admissions decisions since the passage of the Refugee Act
of 1980.
Historical institutionalism, first discussed by Steinmo et al. in 1992, is the
theoretical framework for this study. Historical institutionalism looks both at current
institutional practices and positions but also the origins of those practices and positions
(Thelen, 1999), holding that these practices and positions shaped by organizational
context (Steinmo et al., 1992). Historical institutionalism focuses on gradual
organizational change rather than punctuated or radical change while holding that radical
change can result from the accumulation of gradual changes over time (Fioretos, 2011;
Sorensen, 2015) or external shock (Fioretos, 2011). This study identified whether the
dramatic reductions in refugee admissions determinations under the Trump
administration result for incremental organizational change or represent an external shock
to the Republican position on refugee admissions to the United States. In Chapter 3, I
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discuss how this study was designed, the methodology for conducting the study, and the
data analysis plan.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which the president’s
political party affiliation affects proposed refugee admissions, as outlined in the annual
admissions ceilings and regional allocations, and actual refugee admissions while
controlling for global refugee totals. I also sought to determine the extent to which these
effects are moderated by the party affiliations of the House and Senate. In this chapter, I
discuss the research design and rationale, the study methodology, the data analysis plan,
and threats to validity. I used a nonexperimental, correlative research design and relied on
analysis of existing federal data on the admissions ceiling, regional allocations, and
admissions, as well as UNHCR data on global and regional refugee totals, to examine the
effect of political party affiliation on refugee admissions.
Research Design and Rationale
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The RQs and hypotheses for this study were as follows:
RQ1: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on the
USRAP annual admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals?
H01: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant
effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.
Ha1: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant
effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.
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RQ2: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on total
annual admissions through the USRAP, when controlling for global refugee totals?
H02: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant
effect on total annual admissions through the USRAP.
Ha2: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant
effect on total annual admissions through the USRAP.
RQ3: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on
USRAP regional allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?
H03: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant
effect on USRAP regional allocations.
Ha3: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant
effect on USRAP regional allocations.
RQ4: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on
USRAP regional admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?
H04: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant
effect on USRAP regional admissions.
Ha4: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant
effect on USRAP regional admissions.
RQ5: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the USRAP annual
admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals?
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H05: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on
USRAP annual admissions ceiling.
Ha5: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the
USRAP annual admissions ceiling.
RQ6: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total annual admissions
through the USRAP, when controlling for global refugee totals?
H06: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total
annual admissions through the USRAP.
Ha6: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total
annual admissions through the USRAP.
RQ7: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional
allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?
H07: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on
USRAP regional allocations.
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Ha7: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on
USRAP regional allocations.
RQ8: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional
admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?
H08: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on
USRAP regional admissions.
Ha8: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on
USRAP regional admissions.
Variables
This study included one independent variable, one moderating variable, multiple
dependent variables, and multiple controlling variables.
Independent Variable
The independent, or explanatory, variable was the political party affiliation of the
president of the United States. For RQ1, RQ3, RQ5, and RQ7 the political party
affiliation of each president who issued the final presidential determinations for FY81FY19 was recorded as the independent variable, as the admissions ceiling (RQ1 and
RQ5) and regional allocations (RQ3 and RQ7) are included in the presidential
determination. The exception is FY17, in which the final admissions ceiling was set by
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executive order, rather than presidential determination; for FY17, the party affiliation of
the president issuing the executive order setting the final admissions ceiling was used.
For RQ2, RQ4, RQ6, and RQ8, the political party affiliation of the president who
held office for all or the majority of FY81-FY19 was recorded as the independent
variable. In election years, the presidency may pass from one party to another midway
through the FY on January 20, pursuant to the Twentieth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution (U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 1). In such instances, the political party
affiliation of the president who held office for the majority of the FY (January 20–
September 30) was recorded as the independent variable.
Moderating Variable
The moderating variable in this study was the political party affiliation of the
Senate and House majorities. This variable was represented as Senate majority x House
majority. For RQ5 and RQ7, the political party affiliations of the Senate and House
majorities were recorded for the date on which the final presidential determination was
signed by the president. For RQ6 and RQ8, the affiliation of the party that held the
majority in the Senate and House for all or most of FY81-FY19 was recorded. In election
years, when the Senate or House majority may change when newly elected members are
sworn in (Congressional Research Service, 2018a, p. 6, 2018b, p. 2) in January, pursuant
to the Twentieth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 2), the
party that held the majority in each chamber for the majority of the FY (January–
September) was recorded for the moderating variable.
Dependent Variables
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This study included multiple dependent, or outcome, variables. The dependent
variable for RQ1 and RQ5 was the admissions ceiling, as set in the final annual
presidential determination for each FY for FY81-FY19, with the exception of FY17 when
the final admission ceiling was set by executive order. The dependent variable for RQ2
and RQ6 was the total refugees admitted during each FY for FY81-FY19, as reported by
PRM. The dependent variables for RQ3 and RQ7 were regional allocations as set in the
final annual presidential determination for each FY for FY81-FY19, and the dependent
variables for RQ4 and RQ8 were regional admissions for each FY for FY81-FY19, as
reported by PRM.
Controlling Variables
This study included multiple controlling variables. The controlling variable for
RQ1, RQ2, RQ5, and RQ6 was the total number of refugees, globally, as reported by the
UNHCR. The controlling variables for RQ3, RQ4, RQ7 and RQ8 were the total number
of global refugees by region, as reported by the UNHCR. The UNHCR reports on global
refugee numbers on a calendar year basis, with reports issued early- to midyear of the
following calendar year (UNHCR, 2021a). For RQ1, RQ3, RQ5, and RQ7, the
controlling variables represent the global refugee numbers available from the UNHCR at
the time that the final presidential determination or executive order was issued. For RQ2,
RQ4, RQ6, and RQ8, the controlling variables represent the global refugee numbers
available from the UNCHR at the end of the federal FY, which is the calendar year that
overlapped the start of the federal FY.
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Research Design
For this quantitative study, I used a nonexperimental correlative design and
performed secondary data analysis. Secondary data are data that have been collected by
someone other than the researcher, often by a government, and made available for public
use (Salkind, 2010). Secondary data analysis was chosen for this study because the
federal government’s data included the total population of refugees admitted to the
United States and UNHCR’s data included the total population of known refugees
worldwide. When the entire population is included in research, more about the population
can be known as a certainty, which can be preferable to making inferences based on a
sample of the population (Salkind, 2010).
A nonexperimental study is one in which the independent variable is not
manipulated and there are no random group assignments associated with the study
(Glasofer & Townsend, 2020). As this study involved the use of secondary data, there
was neither manipulation of variables nor random group assignments, making this study a
nonexperimental design. This study’s RQs focused on the effect of presidential party
affiliation on refugee admissions. A correlational research design was appropriate, as
correlational research is used to measure how factors or variables are related and the
extent to which the variables change in an identifiable pattern (Privitera, 2017, p. 240).
Identifying correlations between political party affiliations and refugee admissions
addressed the RQs put forward in this study.
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Methodology
Population
The primary target population for this study was refugees who have been admitted
to the United States through the USRAP from the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980
through FY19. This included refugees who arrived in the U.S. FY81-FY19. According to
Refugee Council USA (2017), more than 3 million refugees have been resettled in the
United States between the passage of the Refugee Act and the end of FY16 (p. 1), with
approximately 95,000 additional refugees resettled between FY17 and FY19
(International Rescue Committee, 2019a). PRM makes public data on the total population
of refugees admitted annually through the RPC. As a result of the publicly available data,
sampling of the refugee population was not required.
To control for global and regional refugee numbers, the worldwide refugee
population was also included in this study. The UNHCR makes public the total
population of refugees globally as well as by country of nationality and country of first
asylum. These data are available by calendar year beginning in 1951, with data for each
year made public early- to midyear the following year (UNHCR, 2021a). This study
included worldwide and regional UNCHR data from 1979 through 2018. As a result of
the publicly available data, sampling of the refugee population was not required.
Additional populations included in this study were presidents who held office
FY81-FY19 and Senate and House majorities during FY81-FY19. The total population of
presidents, as well as Senate and House members and majorities, was publicly available,
and sampling was not necessary.
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Use of Archival Data
I primarily relied on archival data. The archival data included the entire
population of all groups studied, providing greater confidence in the study’s outcomes
than a sample (see Salkind, 2010). Data from federal agencies have been shown to have
high quality and reliability (Salkind, 2010), which is another advantage that the data
provided. The admissions ceiling and proposed regional allocations are formalized
annually by presidential determination, pursuant to the Refugee Act of 1980. These
presidential determinations are published in the Federal Register. For this study,
presidential determinations for each fiscal year from FY81-FY19 were retrieved
electronically from the Federal Register at www.federalregister.gov or
www.archives.gov/federal-register, where current and historical publications have been
digitized and are publicly available.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security and USCIS publishes an annual
Yearbook for Immigration Statistics, available online through the department’s website
or through USCIS’s History Office and Library website. Data from each yearbook lists
final admissions ceilings and final regional allocations, identifying any FY in which
either was changed through use of the unallocated reserve or through presidential
determination or executive order. Yearbooks for FY81-FY19 were reviewed to detect any
midyear changes and ensure that final ceilings and regional allocations were used in data
analysis.
PRM publishes refugee admissions data online through the RPC at
www.wrapsnet.org. The data for FY81-FY19 were publicly available and did not require
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permissions to access. Data from the RPC included annual refugee admissions numbers,
both in aggregate and by region. For this study, annual admissions totals and annual
regional admissions were retrieved from the RPC for each FY from FY81-FY19.
The UNHCR publishes global refugee data online at www.unhcr.org/refugeestatistics. The data since 1951 were publicly available and did not require permissions to
access. Data from the UNCHR included total global refugee numbers, as well as by
region. For this study, annual global refugee totals, annual total refugees by country of
nationality, and annual total refugees by country of first asylum were retrieved from the
UNCHR for calendar years 1979-2018.
The political party affiliations of the president, the Senate majority, and the House
majority were publicly available through their respective websites (U.S. House, n.d.; U.S.
Senate, n.d.; White House, n.d.). The political party affiliation of the president for each
FY from FY81-FY19 was retrieved from the White House’s website,
www.whitehouse.gov. The Senate majority for each FY from FY81-FY19 was retrieved
from the Senate’s website, www.senate.gov. The House majority for each FY from
FY81-FY19 was retrieved from the House’s website, www.house.gov. No permissions
were required to access the data.
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs
Presidential Party Affiliation
Presidential party affiliation was the independent variable for all RQs in this
study. Presidential party affiliation is defined as the political party with which the elected
president has affiliated themself. With the exception of George Washington, all U.S.
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presidents have been affiliated with a political party (Jamison, 2014). The party affiliation
for each president from FY81-FY19 was identified using publicly available information
at the White House website. All presidents during that period identified as either a
Democrat or Republican, and each president had their party affiliation coded as
“Democrat” or “Republican”. These records were then dummy coded in order to conduct
regression analysis. For RQ1 and RQ5, the political party affiliation of each president
who set the final admissions ceiling was recorded as the independent variable. For fiscal
years in which the admissions ceiling changed midyear (FY88, FY89, FY99, and FY17),
the party affiliation of the president issuing the final ceiling was used as the independent
variable for RQ1 and RQ5.
For RQ3 and RQ7, the political party affiliation of each president who set the
final regional allocations was recorded as the independent variable. For fiscal years in
which regional allocations changed midyear through presidential determination (FY88,
FY89, and FY99), the party affiliation of the president issuing the final regional
allocations was used as the independent variable for RQ3 and RQ7. For FY88, FY89, and
FY99, the party affiliation of the president setting the initial regional allocations and the
party affiliation of the president setting the final regional allocations were the same. Only
for FY17 was the party affiliation of the president setting the initial ceiling and the
president setting the final ceiling different. For fiscal years in which regional allocations
changed due to use of the unallocated reserve (FY90, FY91, FY92, FY93, FY94, FY97,
FY98, FY00, FY01, and FY04), the party affiliation of the president issuing the initial
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presidential determination was used, as no secondary presidential determination was
made.
For RQ2, RQ4, RQ6, and RQ8, the political party affiliation of the president who
held office for all or the majority or FY81-FY19 was recorded as the independent
variable. In election years, when the Presidency may pass from one party to another midway through the fiscal year on January 20, pursuant to the Twentieth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution (U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 1), the political party affiliation of the
president who held office for the majority of the fiscal year (January 20–September 30)
was recorded as the independent variable.
Senate and House Majority Party Affiliation
Senate and House majority party affiliation was the moderating variable used in
RQ5, RQ6, RQ7, and RQ8. Senate and House party affiliation is defined as the political
party holding the majority of seats in each chamber of Congress, as identified by the
party affiliation of the Majority Leader in each chamber. The party affiliation of the
Majority Leaders of the Senate from FY81-FY19 is publicly available on the U.S. Senate
website. The party affiliation of the Majority Leaders of the House from FY81-FY19 is
publicly available on the U.S. House of Representatives website. All majorities during
that period were identified as either a Democrat or Republican, and each Senate and
House majority had their party affiliation coded as “Democrat” or “Republican”. These
records were then dummy coded in order to conduct regression analysis. This moderating
variable was expressed as Senate majority x House majority for regression analysis.
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For RQ5 and RQ7, the political party affiliations of the Senate and House
majorities were recorded for the date on which the presidential determination was signed
by the president, setting the admissions ceiling and regional allocations. For fiscal years
in which the admissions ceiling changed midyear through presidential determination
(FY88, FY89, and FY99), the party affiliation of the Senate and House majorities at the
time of the final presidential determination was recorded for RQ5. For fiscal years in
which the regional allocations changed midyear through presidential determination
(FY88, FY89, and FY99), the party affiliation of the Senate and House majorities at the
time of the final presidential determination was recorded for RQ7.
Although presidential determinations require consultation with Congress, the
executive orders issued in FY17 lowering the admissions ceiling did not require
Congressional consultation (Bolton & Thrower, 2016, p. 649). For the sake of
consistency with midyear changes by presidential determination in FY88, FY89, and
FY99, however, the Senate and House majorities at the time of the Executive Orders was
recorded for RQ5 for FY17. Unlike the presidential determinations in FY88, FY89, and
FY90, which modified the regional allocations for the respective FYs, the executive
orders lowering the FY17 ceiling did not address regional allocations. Therefore, the
Senate and House majorities at the time of the original FY17 presidential determination
were recorded for RQ7 for FY17.
For RQ6 and RQ8, the affiliation of the party that held the majority in the Senate
and House for all or most of FY81-FY19 was recorded. In election years, when the
Senate or House majority may change when newly elected members are sworn in
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(Congressional Research Service, 2018a, p. 6; 2018b, p. 2) in January, pursuant to the
Twentieth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution (U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 2), the party
that held the majority in each chamber for most of the fiscal year (January–September)
was recorded for the moderating variable.
Dependent Variables
This study involved multiple dependent variables, including annual admissions
ceilings (RQ1 and RQ5), annual total admissions (RQ2 and RQ6), annual regional
allocations (RQ3 and RQ7), and annual regional admissions (RQ4 and RQ8).
Admissions Ceiling. The refugee admissions ceiling is the maximum number of
refugees permitted to enter the United States in a given fiscal year, as set annually by
presidential determination (Martin & Yankay, 2013). Admissions ceilings were recorded
in whole numbers for each FY (FY81-FY19). For fiscal years in which the admissions
ceiling was changed midyear by presidential determination (FY88, FY89, and FY99) or
by executive order (FY17), the final admissions ceiling for the fiscal year was recorded.
For those fiscal years in which the federally funded admissions ceiling differed from the
overall admissions ceiling (FY88-FY95) due to the Private Sector Initiative (PSI)
launched under the Reagan administration, the federally funded admissions ceiling was
used. Not only was the PSI program discontinued due lack of interest and limited use
(Barnett, 2002, p. 164), but the portion of the admissions ceiling designated for PSI was
often not tied to a specific region and the national and/or regional information for the
limited number of refugees admitted through the PSI is not available through PRM,
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making the inclusion of PSI data irrelevant to this study. Exclusion of PSI admissions is
not uncommon in studies related to U.S. refugee admissions (Teitelbaum, 1998, p. 471).
Regional Allocations. The regional allocations are the maximum number of
refugees permitted to enter the United States from specific geographic regions of the
world in a given fiscal year. These allocations are subsets of the overall admissions
ceiling (Martin & Yankay, 2013). PRM currently categorizes regions as East Asia,
Eastern Europe & Central Asia, Near East & South Asia, Latin America & Caribbean,
and Africa. Regional allocations for each of these categories were recorded in whole
numbers. In FY90, when PSI designated slots were included in regional allocations, only
federally funded slots were included.
“East Asia” has been consistently used as a region since FY83. In FY81 and
FY82, this region was referred to in presidential determinations as “Asia” and was
distinguished from the “Near East”, which was also used only in FY81 and FY82. In this
study, the “Asia” regional allocation in FY81-FY82 was listed as “East Asia”. In FY85FY90, “East Asia” included the two subcategories “East Asia – First Asylum” and “East
Asia – Orderly Departure Program”. Both subsections of “East Asia” were combined for
FY85-FY90 as “East Asia”.
“Eastern Europe & Central Asia” has been listed as a region since FY04. In
FY81-FY82 and FY90-FY92, this region was represented as the two regions of “Eastern
Europe” and the “Soviet Union”. From FY83-FY89, this was a single region referred to
as “Soviet Union & Eastern Europe,” which became the “Former Soviet Union & Eastern
Europe” from FY94-FY96. In FY97-FY99, this region was simply referred to as
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“Europe”, but in FY00 was divided into “Former Yugoslavia”, “Kosovo Crisis”, and
“Newly Independent States/Baltics”. In FY01-FY03 and in FY93, this region was
represented as the two separate regions of “Eastern Europe” and the “Former Soviet
Union”, before becoming “Eastern Europe & Central Asia” in FY04. Despite the history
of diverse regional names, Congressional Reports are clear that these regions are now
represented as “Eastern Europe & Central Asia” (Bruno, 2018, p. 12) and have been
combined on an annual basis and listed as “Eastern Europe & Central Asia” in this study.
“Near East & South Asia” has been consistently used as a region since FY83. In
FY81-82, this region was known as simply as “Near East”. All regional allocations for
the “Near East” are listed as “Near East & South Asia” in this study.
“Latin America & Caribbean” has been listed as a region each year except for
FY85, when only “Latin America” was listed; in this study, “Latin America” was
included as “Latin America & Caribbean”. In FY81, “Latin America & Caribbean” had
two subsections, which included “Latin America & Caribbean – Cuba” and “Latin
America & Caribbean – Other”. Both of these FY81 subsections have been combined
into “Latin America & Caribbean” for this study.
“Africa” has been used as a single category in every presidential determination
since FY81, and no reclassification of previous names for this region were required.
Total Admissions. Total admissions refer to the total number of refugees
admitted to the United States in a specific fiscal year. Total refugee admissions numbers
were retrieved from PRM and recorded as whole numbers. For fiscal years in which
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refugees were admitted through the PSI program (FY88-FY93), PSI admissions were not
included in the total refugee admissions in this study.
Regional Admissions. Regional admissions refer to the total number of refugees
admitted to the United States from specific regions in a given fiscal year. PRM reports
regional admissions in the same regional categories as regional allocations were made in
that fiscal year. Due to the changing names of regions between FY81-FY19,
reclassifications were required for refugee admissions by region, and these were done in
the same manner outlined for Regional Allocations, above. Regional admissions were
retrieved from PRM and recorded as whole numbers. In FY90, when PSI designated slots
were used for regional admissions, only federally funded admissions were included.
Controlling Variables
This study involved multiple controlling variables, including the global refugee
totals (RQ1, RQ3, RQ5, and RQ7) and global refugee totals by region (RQ2, RQ4, RQ6,
and RQ8).
Global Refugee Totals. Global refugee totals refer to the total number of
refugees in the world under the UNHCR’s mandate, as published by the UNHCR. The
UNHCR publishes calendar year data for the previous calendar year early- to midyear the
following year. Global refugee levels were represented in whole numbers.
For RQ1 and RQ5, the most recent data available at the time the final admissions
ceiling was set, generally the year prior to the start of the fiscal year. For FY88, FY89,
FY99, and FY17, in which the admissions ceiling was modified midyear, UNHCR data
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from the year overlapping the start of the fiscal year was available and this data was used
for controlling variables for RQ1 and RQ5.
For RQ2 and RQ6, the most recent data available by the end of the fiscal year was
used, which was the calendar year that overlapped the start of the fiscal year.
Global Refugee Totals by Region. Global refugee populations by region refers
to the total number of refugees by region, corresponding with the regions outlined by
PRM, namely East Asia, Eastern Europe & Central Asia, Near East & South Asia, Latin
America & Caribbean, and Africa. Numbers for each region were represented in whole
numbers.
The UNHCR’s annual data reports include refugees by country of nationality but
does not divide refugees into specific regions. In order to categorize refugees by regions
that correspond to PRM’s regions, each country producing a refugee was designated into
a specific region. As PRM is a Bureau within the U.S. Department of State, the regional
designations of countries, as outlined by specific Bureaus overseen by the Under
Secretary for Political Affairs, were used to categorize countries into the appropriate
region. For nationalities listed by UNHCR that were not accounted for by one of the
Bureaus, geographic location and dependency information from the U.S. Department of
State were reviewed to determine the most appropriate regional categorization.
For a complete list of countries and areas classified as East Asia, along with
country-specific operationalization details, see Appendix A. For a complete list of
countries and areas classified as Eastern Europe & Central Asia, along with countryspecific operationalization details, see Appendix B. For a complete list of countries and
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areas classified as Near East & South Asia, along with country-specific operationalization
details, see Appendix C. For a complete list of countries and areas classified as Latin
America & Caribbean, along with country-specific operationalization details, see
Appendix D. For a complete list of countries and areas classified as Africa, along with
country-specific operationalization details, see Appendix E.
In addition to the countries of nationality listed for refugees by the UNHCR,
many refugees were listed as being stateless or having an unknown nationality. Stateless
individuals are those who “under national laws, [do] not enjoy citizenship – the legal
bond between a government and an individual – in any country” (U.S. Department of
State, n.d.i). In order to include the entire global refugee in a specific geographic region,
an alternative means of categorization was needed for individuals listed as stateless or
having an unknown nationality. Along with listing the country of nationality in their data
reports, the UNHCR also lists each refugee’s country of first asylum. Studies show that
the vast majority of refugees fleeing their country of nationality, or for those without a
nationality their country of habitual residence, flee to neighboring countries (Van Hear,
2006, p. 9). Given this tendency to flee to geographically proximate countries, the
country of first asylum was used to identify the most appropriate regional category for
refugees with a nationality listed as stateless or unknown. For example, if a refugee’s
nationality was listed as unknown, but their country of first asylum was identified by the
UNHCR as Thailand, that refugee was counted as part of East Asia, based on Thailand
being part of the East Asia region.
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For RQ3 and RQ7, the most recent data available at the time final regional
allocations was set, generally the year prior to the start of the fiscal year. For FY88,
FY89, and FY99, in which regional allocations were modified midyear, UNHCR data
from the year overlapping the start of the fiscal year was available and this data was used
as controlling variables for RQ3 and RQ7.
For RQ4 and RQ8, the most recent data available by the end of the fiscal year was
used, which was the calendar year that overlapped the start of the fiscal year.
Data Analysis Plan
Hierarchical regression analysis was used to explain the effect of the president’s
political party on refugee admission and moderating effects of the Senate and House
majorities. Data analysis was completed using the Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences (SPSS), version 25.
Statistical Tests
Hierarchical regression was used to answer all RQs in this study. Hierarchical, or
sequential, regression is a form of multiple linear regression in which variables are
entered in separate steps, or “blocks,” and is often used to analyze the moderating effects
of a variable (IBM, n.d.b). Hierarchical regression identifies variance in a specific
dependent variable after accounting for all other variables (Kim, 2016, para. 1).This was
an appropriate statistical test, as RQ1, RQ2, RQ3, and RQ4 sought to identify the
variance accounted for by presidential party affiliation, after accounting for global
refugee totals, and R5, RQ6, RQ7, and RQ8 sought to identify the variance accounted for
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by Senate and House majority party affiliations, after accounting for both global refugee
totals and presidential party affiliation.
For RQ1 and RQ2, global refugee totals were entered into the first block, and
presidential party affiliation was entered into the second block. The model significance
was reviewed by examining the F-change (ΔF) significance. If the model was significant
with a p-value of <0.05, the coefficient of determination, R2, was interpreted. The R2
change (ΔR2) was particularly significant in this analysis, as it indicates the effect of
presidential party affiliation, after controlling for global refugee totals. In reviewing the
coefficients output, the constant, a, and the unstandardized beta coefficients, b, were used
in the regression equation of Ŷ= a+ b1X1+b2X2 for predicting the admissions ceiling and
total admissions by party affiliation of the president after controlling for global refugee
totals.
For RQ3 and RQ4, global refugee totals by region were entered into the first
block, and presidential party affiliation was entered into the second block. The model
significance was reviewed by examining the F-change (ΔF) significance. If the model
was significant with a p-value of <0.05, the coefficient of determination, R2, was
interpreted, with specific attention to ΔR2. In reviewing the coefficients output, the
constant, a, and the unstandardized beta coefficients, b, were used in the regression
equation of Ŷ= a+ b1X1+b2X2 for predicting regional allocations and regional admissions
by party affiliation of the president after controlling for global refugee totals by region.
For RQ5 and RQ6, global refugee totals were entered into the first block,
presidential party affiliation was entered into the second block, and Senate and House
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majority party affiliation into the third block as Senate majority x House majority. The
model significance was reviewed by examining the F-change (ΔF) significance. If the
model was significant with a p-value of <0.05, the coefficient of determination, R2 for the
third block was interpreted with specific attention to ΔR2. In reviewing the coefficients
output, the constant, a, and the unstandardized beta coefficients, b, were used in the
regression equation of Ŷ= a+ b1X1+b2X2+b3X3 for predicting the admissions ceiling or
total admissions by party affiliation of the president after controlling for global refugee
totals, as moderated by the party affiliation of the Senate and House majorities.
For RQ7 and RQ8, global refugee totals by region were entered into the first
block, presidential party affiliation was entered into the second block, and Senate and
House majority party affiliation into the third block as Senate majority x House majority.
The model significance was reviewed by examining the F-change (ΔF) significance If the
model was significant with a p-value of <0.05, the coefficient of determination, R2 for the
third block was interpreted with specific attention to ΔR2. In reviewing the coefficients
output, the constant, a, and the unstandardized beta coefficients, b, were used in the
regression equation of Ŷ= a+ b1X1+b2X2+b3X3 for predicting regional allocations and
regional admissions by party affiliation of the president after controlling for global
refugee totals by region, as moderated by the party affiliation of the Senate and House
majorities.
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Threats to Validity
Internal Validity and Credibility
Credibility and internal validity are ways of considering the extent to which
research is truthful (Mills et al., 2010, p. 243). Strategies to enhance credibility include
the use of established research methods, triangulation, addressing sampling bias, and
examination of previous findings (Shenton, 2004, pp. 64-69). The use of secondary
analysis of data provided by the federal government and the United Nations is a wellestablished and widely accepted method of conducting research (Babbie, 2017; Orzes, et
al., 2018). Because the entire population of refugees admitted, global refugees,
presidential majority parties, and Senate and House majority parties were included in this
study, no sampling took place in which bias could have been present. Triangulation was
done by comparing annual admissions numbers, in aggregate and by region, using PRM’s
data and the annual Yearbook for Immigration Statistics; data from annual presidential
determinations and the annual Yearbook for Immigration Statistics were also
triangulated. This triangulation identified the years in which secondary presidential
determinations had been issued and admissions ceilings and regional allocations had been
adjusted midyear. The conclusions drawn in this study were also compared to findings in
previous studies and were found to be in line with prior findings; findings are discussed
in the following chapters.
Internal validity involves the possibility that the conclusions drawn from the
results may not reflect what actually occurred (Babbie, 2017, p. 243). The threat to
internal validity in this study was related to instrumentation, or the manner in which
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variables were measured (Babbie, 2017, p. 243). PRM’s regional groupings changed over
time, although current regional designations have remained the same since FY04. For
each FY (FY81-FY03); however, some level of recategorization of regions was required
in order to align with current regional groupings. In addition, the UNHCR does not
designate refugees by region, but by country of nationality only. Consequently, country
groupings were established to correspond with PRM’s regional categories. These
groupings were made based on U.S. Department of State regional designations, as PRM
is part of the department.
External Validity
Transferability
Transferability both related to the generalizability of findings, which are based on
samples of a population in most studies, to the total population being studied (Babbie,
2017, p. 245; Shenton 2004, p. 69). This study relied on the entire population of all
groups being studied, rather than a sample of any of these populations. As a result, there
are no concerns related to transferability for this study.
Dependability and Reliability
Dependability and reliability refer to the ability to achieve the same results if
another researcher were to duplicate the study (Babbie, 2017, pp. 418-419; Shenton,
2004, p. 71). Methods that can be employed to increase dependability and reliability
include clear presentation of the research design and implementation and detailed
descriptions of operationalization (Shenton 2004, pp. 71-72). In this chapter, I have
presented a clear description of the sources for each data point collected, the methods of
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operationalizing the data, and additional descriptions for the data analysis are presented
in Chapter 4. Sufficient data has been provided to ensure that this research study can be
duplicated by another researcher.
Confirmability and Objectivity
Confirmability and objectivity are both related to the neutrality of the researcher
in relation to the data (Stumpfegger, 2017) and the distance the researcher is able to keep
from the study subjects (Shenton, 2004). Triangulation can play an important role in
confirming objectivity and confirmability (Shenton, 2004, p. 72). Triangulation was
completed in this study for annual admissions, regional admissions, annual ceilings, and
regional ceilings. This study secondary data analysis, ensuring that there was no
interaction between the study subjects and the researcher. In operationalizing the data,
operational decisions were guided by the definitions and explanations provided by the
secondary data source to ensure the neutrality of the operational decisions.
Summary
This non-experimental correlative study examined the effect of presidential
political party affiliation on the admissions ceiling, total admissions, regional allocations,
and regional admissions after controlling for global refugee totals, and also assessed the
moderating effect of the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities.
SPSS was used to conduct hierarchical multiple regression analysis to address the RQs
presented in this study. Chapter 4 details the data collection undertaken to conduct this
study as well as the study’s results.
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Chapter 4: Results
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to examine the extent to which the president’s
political party affiliation affects proposed refugee admissions, as outlined in the annual
admissions ceilings and regional allocations, and actual refugee admissions while
controlling for global refugee totals. I also sought to determine the extent to which these
effects are moderated by the party affiliations of the House and Senate. In this chapter, I
discuss the data collection process, provide descriptive statistics of the data, and detail
results of the data analysis.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The RQs and hypotheses for this study are as follows:
RQ1: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on the
USRAP annual admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals?
H01: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant
effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.
Ha1: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant
effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.
RQ2: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on total
annual admissions through the USRAP, when controlling for global refugee totals?
H02: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant
effect on total annual admissions through the USRAP.
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Ha2: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant
effect on total annual admissions through the USRAP.
RQ3: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on
USRAP regional allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?
H03: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant
effect on USRAP regional allocations.
Ha3: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant
effect on USRAP regional allocations.
RQ4: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on
USRAP regional admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?
H04: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant
effect on USRAP regional admissions.
Ha4: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant
effect on USRAP regional admissions.
RQ5: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the USRAP annual
admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals?
H05: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on
USRAP annual admissions ceiling.
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Ha5: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the
USRAP annual admissions ceiling.
RQ6: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total annual admissions
through the USRAP, when controlling for global refugee totals?
H06: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total
annual admissions through the USRAP.
Ha6: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total
annual admissions through the USRAP.
RQ7: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional
allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?
H07: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on
USRAP regional allocations.
Ha7: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on
USRAP regional allocations.
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RQ8: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional
admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?
H08: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on
USRAP regional admissions.
Ha8: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on
USRAP regional admissions.
Data Collection
I obtained IRB approval (no. 12-01-20-0670738) from Walden University in
December 2020 and collected all preliminary data that month. Political party affiliation
data included the presidential party affiliation of each president (FY81-FY19) from the
White House website, the party affiliation of each Senate majority (FY81-FY19) from the
U.S. Senate website, and the party affiliation of each House majority (FY81-FY19) from
the U.S. House of Representatives website. Political party affiliation data were available
for all presidents as well as Senate and House majorities for each year FY81-FY19. Data
on refugee admissions, both in aggregate and by region, were retrieved from PRM’s RPC
website at www.wrapsnet.org. Data were available for total and regional refugee
admissions for all years FY81-FY19. Data on the global refugee totals, global refugee
totals by country of nationality, and global refugees totals by country of first asylum for
calendar years 1979-2018 were retrieved from the UNHCR’s Refugee Data Finder
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website at www.unhcr.org/refugee-satistics. Data were available for total global refugees,
refugees by country of nationality, and refugees by country of first asylum for all years
1979-2018. Data on annual admissions ceilings and regional allocations, published in the
presidential determination FY81-FY19, were retrieved from the Federal Register at
www.federalregister.gov and/or www.archives.gov/federal-register. All presidential
determinations with admissions ceilings and regional allocations were available for each
year FY81-FY19.
After operationalizing the data and conducting data analysis, I noticed that the
total number of refugee admissions in 3 fiscal years exceeded the admissions ceiling,
suggesting that a change had been made to the admissions ceiling subsequent to the
ceiling set in the presidential determination at the start of the fiscal year. I submitted a
request to amend the data collection plan to the IRB to include review of USCIS’s
Yearbook for Immigration Statistics FY81-FY19, to review final admissions ceilings and
regional allocations on February 12, 2021; the request was approved the same day.
Between February 13-14, 2021, I retrieved all USCIS Yearbooks for Immigration
Statistics FY81-FY19 from U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s website (FY96FY19) or from USCIS’s Historical Office and Library (FY81-FY95).
Yearbooks for FY88, FY89, and FY99 indicated that admissions ceilings were
increased during the FY. I retrieved each updated presidential determination (FY88,
FY89, and FY99) indicating the increased admissions ceilings and adjusting regional
allocations from the Federal Register. Yearbooks for FY90, FY91, FY92, FY93, FY94,
FY97, FY98, FY00, FY01, and FY04 showed adjusted regional allocations through the
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distribution of the unallocated reserve to specific regions, not through the issuance of a
secondary presidential determination. The executive order issued in FY17 lowering the
admissions ceiling was identified during the literature review and was the source of
FY17’s final admissions ceiling number. After collecting data for final admissions
ceilings and regional allocations, data were operationalized, as outlined in Chapter 3, and
data analysis was completed.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
The independent variable in RQ1, RQ3, RQ5, and RQ7 was the political party
affiliation of the president who set the final admission ceiling (RQ1 and RQ5) and final
regional allocations (RQ3 and RQ7) for the FY (see Table 1). The moderating variables
were the political party affiliation of the Senate and House majorities at the time the final
admissions ceiling (RQ5) and the final regional allocations (RQ7) were set. As shown in
Table 1, 17 of 39 (43.5%) of admission ceilings were set by presidents affiliated with the
Democratic Party, while 18 of 39 (46.2%) of regional allocations were set by presidents
affiliated with the Democratic Party, resulting from the FY17 executive order issued by
Trump lowering the admissions ceiling without addressing regional allocations. At the
time that admissions ceilings and regional allocations were finalized, 20 (51.3%) of
Senate majorities were Republican and 19 (48.7%) were Democratic. House majorities at
the time admissions ceilings and regional allocations were finalized were 48.7% (19)
Democratic and 51.3% (20) Republican.
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Table 1
Final Admission Ceilings and Regional Allocations by Party Affiliation
FY81
FY82
FY83
FY84
FY85
FY86
FY87
FY88
FY89
FY90
FY91
FY92
FY93
FY94
FY95
FY96
FY97
FY98
FY99
FY00
FY01
FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17 – regional allocations
FY17 – admissions ceiling
FY18
FY19

Presidential party
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican

Senate majority party
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican

House majority party
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican

Note. Regional allocations for FY17 were set under the Obama administration (Democrat) and were not
addressed in the executive order setting the final admission ceiling for FY17 under the Trump
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administration (Republican); this is the only fiscal year in which the admissions ceiling and regional
allocations were set by different administrations.

The independent variable for RQ2, RQ4, RQ6, and RQ8 was the political party
affiliation of the president who held office for all or the majority of the FY, with the
Senate and House majority party affiliations for the party holding the majority of the
chamber for all or most of the FY serving as the moderating variable for RQ6 and RQ8.
As shown in Table 2, Republican presidents held office for 51.3% (20) of FYs (FY81FY19), with Democratic presidents holding office for 48.7% (19). Republicans held the
Senate majority in 53.8% (21) of FYs, with Democrats holding the majority in 46.2%
(18). Republicans held the House majority for 51.3% (20) of FYs, with Democrats
holding the majority in 48.7% (19).
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Table 2
Party Affiliations During the Fiscal Year of Admissions
FY81
FY82
FY83
FY84
FY85
FY86
FY87
FY88
FY89
FY90
FY91
FY92
FY93
FY94
FY95
FY96
FY97
FY98
FY99
FY00
FY01
FY02
FY03
FY04
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14
FY15
FY16
FY17
FY18
FY19

Presidential party
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican

Senate majority party
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican

House majority party
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Republican
Democrat

94
Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables in RQ1, RQ3, RQ5, and RQ7 are
found in Table 3. The dependent variable for RQ1 and RQ5 was the final refugee
admissions ceiling (M = 86941.03, SD = 31590.078), which ranged from a high of
217,000 in FY81 to a low of 30,000 in FY19. The dependent variables for RQ3 and RQ7
were the regional allocations (RA) for each of the following regions: East Asia, Eastern
Europe and Central Asia, Near East and South Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, and
Africa. Regional allocations for East Asia (M = 30824.36, SD = 31280.316) ranged from
Table 3
Annual Ceiling and Regional Allocations
Annual Ceiling
RA – East Asia
RA – Eastern Europe & Central Asia
RA – Near East & South Asia
RA – Latin America & Caribbean
RA – Africa

N
39
39
39
39
39
39

Minimum
30000
4000
1000
2500
1000
2000

Maximum
217000
168000
64300
40000
9000
35000

M
86941.03
30824.36
23943.59
13835.90
3865.90
12138.46

SD
31590.078
31280.316
21544.761
12555.545
1640.168
8429.916

a high of 168,000 in FY81 to a low of 4,000 in FY02, FY03, and FY19. Regional
allocations for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (M = 23943.59, SD = 21544.761) ranged
from a high of 64,300 in FY92 to a low of 1,000 in FY14 and FY15. Regional allocations
for Near East and South Asia (M = 13835.90, SD = 12555.545) ranged from a high of
40,000 in FY17 to a low of 2,500 in FY05. Regional allocations for Latin America and
Caribbean (M = 3865.90, SD = 1640.168) ranged from a high of 9,000 in FY94 to a low
of 1,000 in FY84 and FY85. Regional allocations for Africa (M = 12138.46, SD =
8429.916) ranged from a high of 35,000 in FY17 to a low of 2,000 in FY89.
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Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables in RQ2, RQ4, RQ6, and RQ8 are
found in Table 4. The dependent variable for RQ2 and R6 was total number of refugees
admitted annually (M = 74031.03, SD = 29583.081), which ranged from a high of
159,252 in FY81 to a low of 22,517 in FY18. The dependent variables for RQ4 and RQ8
were the regional admissions for each of the following regions: East Asia, Eastern Europe
and Central Asia, Near East and South Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, and Africa.
Table 4
Total Admissions and Regional Admissions
Total Annual Admissions
East Asia Admissions
Eastern Europe & Central Asia
Admissions
Near East & South Asia Admissions
Latin America & Caribbean Admissions
Africa Admissions

N
39
39
39

Minimum
22517
1724
580

Maximum
159252
131139
64312

M
74031.03
27423.23
21650.21

SD
29583.081
25594.904
20788.995

39
39
39

2801
131
1322

38280
7629
31624

11901.36
2686.8
10369.38

11439.865
1826.111
7964.187

Regional admissions for East Asia (M = 27423.23 SD = 25594.904) ranged from a high
of 131,139 in FY81 to a low of 1,724 in FY03. Regional admissions for Eastern Europe
and Central Asia (M = 21650.21, SD = 20788.995) ranged from a high of 64,312 in FY92
to a low of 580 in FY13. Regional admissions for Near East and South Asia (M =
11901.36, SD = 11439.865) ranged from a high of 38,280 in FY09 to a low of 2801 in
FY19. Regional admissions for Latin America and Caribbean (M = 2686.8, SD =
1826.111) ranged from a high of 7629 in FY95 to a low of 131 in FY86. Regional
admissions for Africa (M = 10369.38, SD = 7964.187) ranged from a high of 31,624 in
FY16 to a low of 1322 in FY86.
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Descriptive statistics for the controlling variables in RQ1, RQ2, RQ5, and RQ6
are found in Table 5. The controlling variable in RQ1 and RQ2 was the total number of
global refugees as reported by the UNHCR (M = 12519568.49, SD = 3080538.951) most
recently available at the time the annual ceiling was finalized, which ranged from a high
of 19,940,568 in FY19 to a low of 6,279,912 in FY81. The dependent variables for RQ5
and RQ6 were the regional number of refugees reported by the UNHCR most recently
available at the time the annual ceiling was finalized for each of the following regions:
East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Near East and South Asia, Latin America
and Caribbean, and Africa. Regional refugee totals for East Asia (M = 929942.82, SD =
184007.398) ranged from a high of 1,753,408 in FY19 to a low of 669,494 in FY88.
Table 5
Total Global and Regional Refugees at the Finalization of Admissions Ceilings and
Regional Allocations
Total Global Refugees
UNHCR – East Asia
UNCHR – Eastern Europe & Central
Asia
UNHCR – Near East & South Asia
UNHCR – Latin America & Caribbean
UNHCR – Africa

N
39
39
39

Minimum
6279912
669494
3660

Maximum
19940568
1753408
2495562

M
12519568.49
929942.82
892524.72

SD
3080538.951
184007.398
802644.522

39
39
39

600670
83710
2630703

9994746
1243412
7190809

5288832.67
415288.69
4079546.38

1904669.045
347076.332
1246806.487

Regional refugee totals for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (M = 892524.72, SD =
802644.522) ranged from a high of 2,495,56 in FY98 to a low of 3,660 in FY81.
Regional refugee totals for Near East and South Asia (M = 5288832.67, SD =
1904669.045) ranged from a high of 9,994,746 in FY19 to a low of 600,670 in FY81.
Regional refugee totals for Latin America and Caribbean (M = 415288.69, SD =
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347076.332) ranged from a high of 1,243,412 in FY91 to a low of 83,710 in FY02.
Regional refugee totals for Africa (M = 4079546.38, SD = 1246806.487) ranged from a
high of 7,190,809 in FY19 to a low of 2,630,703 in FY010.
Descriptive statistics for the controlling variables in RQ3, RQ4, RQ7, and RQ8
are found in Table 6. The controlling variable in RQ3 and RQ4 was the total number of
global refugees as reported by the UNHCR (M = 1282287.33, SD = 3105752.987) for the
calendar year overlapping the start of the federal fiscal year, which ranged from a high of
20,359,556 in FY19 to a low of 8,454,917 in FY81. The dependent variables for RQ7 and
RQ8 were the regional number of refugees reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year
overlapping the start of the federal fiscal year for each of the following regions:
Table 6
Total Global and Regional Refugees for the Calendar Year Overlapping the Fiscal Year
Total Global Refugees
UNHCR – East Asia
UNCHR – Eastern Europe & Central
Asia
UNHCR – Near East & South Asia
UNHCR – Latin America & Caribbean
UNHCR – Africa

N
39
39
39

Minimum
8454917
669494
15734

Maximum
20359556
1753408
2495562

M
1282287.33
943836.00
910385.64

SD
3105752.978
229083.859
807439.054

39
39
39

1836452
83710
2630703

10440189
1243412
7190809

5521419.10
400088.18
4188248.82

1896562.065
318127.744
1319980.553

East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Near East and South Asia, Latin America
and Caribbean, and Africa. Regional refugee totals for East Asia (M = 943836.00, SD =
229083.859) ranged from a high of 1,753,408 in FY19 to a low of 669,494 in FY88.
Regional refugee totals for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (M = 910385.64, SD =
807439.054) ranged from a high of 2,495,56 in FY98 to a low of 15,734 in FY88.
Regional refugee totals for Near East and South Asia (M = 5521419.10, SD =
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1896562.065) ranged from a high of 10,440,189 in FY19 to a low of 1,836,452 in FY81.
Regional refugee totals for Latin America and Caribbean (M = 400088.18, SD =
318127.744) ranged from a high of 1,243,412 in FY91 to a low of 83,710 in FY01.
Regional refugee totals for Africa (M = 4188248.82, SD = 1319980.553) ranged from a
high of 7,190,809 in FY18 to a low of 2,630,703 in FY09.
Research Question 1
RQ1: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on the
USRAP annual admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals?
H01: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant
effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.
Ha1: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant
effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of the political party
affiliation of the president on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling. The final refugee
admissions ceiling (M = 86941.03, SD = 31590.078) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used
as the dependent variable. The total number of global refugees as reported by the
UNHCR at the time the admissions ceiling was finalized (M = 12519568.49, SD =
3080538.951) was entered into the first block as the controlling variable. presidential
party affiliation of the president setting the final admissions ceiling (0.0 for Democrat,
1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the
independent variable.
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To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d scores from the hierarchical
regression analysis. The Mahalanobis d value indicates the degree to which a value is an
outlier (Warner, 2013, p. 1097) and follows a Chi-square (χ2) distribution
(Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich, 2012) in which df is equal to the number
of explanatory variables in the regression (Brereton, 2015, p. 10). In the analysis for
RQ1, the critical value for Mahalanobis d was 13.816 (at α = .001). No value exceeded
the Mahalanobis d for RQ1.
I also generated Cook’s d scores to screen for outliers. A value is considered an
outlier if the Cook’s d is greater than 4/(n – k – 1), where k is equal to the “number of
terms in the model” (American Psychological Association, n.d., para. 1). In the analysis
for RQ1, the critical value for Cook’s d was .111. The Cook’s d was 1.038 for FY81.
Data for FY81 were removed, and a hierarchical regression was conducted for FY82FY19.
After conducting the hierarchical regression for FY82-FY19, I reviewed variance
inflation factors. Variance inflation factors were well below the 10.0 threshold that would
indicate multicollinearity (Cohen et al., 2015, p. 423) for presidential party affiliation
(VIF = 1.000) and for total global refugees (VIF = 1.000). The normal P-P plot was
reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed. To test for
homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted
values and the absolute standardized residuals (Gignac, 2019, pt. 14.13). The Pearson
correlation was r = .355 (p = .029), indicating heteroscedasticity. A bootstrapped
regression analysis is an appropriate method for addressing issues of heteroscedasticity in
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general (Hartl, 2010, p. 3) and, as in this RQ, in “the case of regression models with
heteroscedastic residuals fit to small samples” (IBM, n.d.a, para. 1). The so-called wild
bootstrap method, specifically, has been established as a model to address heteroscedastic
errors of unknown forms in linear regression models (Flachaire, 2005, p. 362; Gignac,
2019, pt. 14.55).
I conducted a bootstrapped hierarchical regression using the wild bootstrap
Table 7
Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ1
Bootstrapa
BCa 95% Confidence
Interval
Model
2

(Constant)
UNHCR Total
Global
Refugees – At
Final PD/EO
PresPartyPD

a.

B
73898.220

Bias

0.001

14487.749
0.001

-2134.887

2131.784

Std. Error
36170.000

Sig. (2tailed)
0.036

Lower
10855.737

Upper
106808.581

0.003

0.815

-0.004

0.008

7731.085

0.789

19162.099

18143.061

Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 2000 wild bootstrap samples

method, with confidence intervals based on the bias corrected accelerated (BCa) method,
which more accurately identifies the upper- and lower-bounds of the confidence interval
when bootstrapping (IBM, n.d.a, para. 9). I reviewed the bootstrap for coefficients, and
presidential party affiliation was not found to be a statistically significant contributor to
the model (β = -2134.887, p = .789, 95%CI: -19162.099 and 18143.061) (see Table 7).
The model was not found to be significant (ΔF(1, 35) = .071, p = .791, ΔR2 = .002), so
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the model was not interpreted (see Table 8). The model failed to disprove the null
hypothesis for RQ1.
Table 8
Model Summary for RQ1c
Change Statistics

Model
1
2

R
.108a
.117b

R
Square
.012
.014

Adjusted
R Square
-.016
-.043

Std. Error
of the
Estimate
23758.057
24070.530

R
Square
Change
.012
.002

F
Change
.427
.071

df1
1
1

df2
36
35

Sig. F
Change
.518
.791

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Total Global Refugees - At Final PD/EO
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Total Global Refugees - At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD
c. Dependent Variable: Annual Admissions Ceiling

Research Question 2
RQ1: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on the
USRAP annual admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals?
H01: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant
effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.
Ha1: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant
effect on the USRAP annual admissions ceiling.
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party
affiliation of the president on annual admissions through the USRAP. The total number
of refugees admitted annually (M = 74031.03, SD = 29583.081) for each FY (FY81FY19) was used as the dependent variable. The total number of global refugees as
reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year overlapping the start of the federal FY (M
= 12519568.49, SD = 3080538.951) was entered into the first block as the controlling
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variable. Presidential party affiliation of the president in office during the fiscal year for
refugee admissions (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19)
was entered into the second block as the independent variable.
To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook’s d values. The
critical value of Mahalanobis d for RQ2 was 13.816, while the Cook’s d critical value
was .111. No values exceeded the critical value of Mahalanobis d, but FY81 exceeded the
critical value of Cook’s d at .371. Data for FY81 were removed, and a hierarchical
regression was conducted for FY82-FY19.
After conducting the hierarchical regression for FY82-FY19, VIFs were reviewed
and found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.000)
and for total global refugees (VIF = 1.000). I reviewed the normal P-P plot to confirm
that the data were generally normally distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I
conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted values and the
absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was r = .195 (p = .241),
indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the necessary assumptions, the model was
reviewed, ΔF(1, 35) = 2.502, p = .123, ΔR2 = .062 (see Table 9). Because the model was
not significant, it was not interpreted. The model failed to disprove the null hypothesis for
RQ2.
Table 9
Model Summary for RQ2c
Change Statistics

Model
1

R
.269a

R
Square
.072

Adjusted
R
Square
.047

Std. Error
of the
Estimate
25786.092

R
Square
Change
.072

F
Change
2.805

df1
1

df2
36

Sig. F
Change
.103
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2

.366b

.134

.085

25264.333

.062

2.502

1

35

.123

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Total Global Refugees - At End FY
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Total Global Refugees - At End FY, PresPartyFY
c. Dependent Variable: Total Annual Admissions

Research Question 3
RQ3: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on
USRAP regional allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?
H03: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant
effect on USRAP regional allocations.
Ha3: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant
effect on USRAP regional allocations.
I conducted a separate hierarchical regression analysis for each of the following
regions to assess the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on annual
regional allocations: East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Near East and South
Asia, Latin America and Caribbean, and Africa.
RQ3 – East Asia
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party
affiliation of the president on the annual regional allocation for East Asia. The regional
allocations for East Asia (M = 30824.36, SD = 31280.316) for each FY (FY81-FY19)
was used as the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for East Asia (M =
929942.82, SD = 184007.398) as reported by the UNHCR at the time the regional
allocations were finalized was entered into the first block as the controlling variable.
Presidential party affiliation of the president setting the final regional allocations (0.0 for
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Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second
block as the independent variable.
To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook’s d values. The
critical value of Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook’s d critical value
was .111. FY19 exceeded the critical value of Mahalanobis d at 24.641. Both FY19 and
FY82 exceeded the critical value of Cook’s d at 2.247 and .113, respectively. FY19 and
FY82 were removed from the dataset.
I conducted a hierarchical regression for the remaining 37 fiscal years, then VIFs
were reviewed and found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation
(VIF = 1.576) and for total global refugees from East Asia (VIF = 1.576). The normal PP plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed. To test
for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized
predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was r =
.114 (p = .503), indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the necessary assumptions, the
model was reviewed, ΔF(1, 34) = 1.089, p = .304, ΔR2 = .031 (see Table 10). Because the
model was not significant, it was not interpreted. The model failed to disprove the null
hypothesis for RQ3 for East Asia.
Table 10
Model Summary for RQ3 for East Asia
Change Statistics

Model
1
2

R
.063a
.187b

R
Square
.004
.035

Adjusted
R
Square
-.025
-.022

Std. Error
of the
Estimate
30001.712
29963.575

R
Square
Change
.004
.031

F
Change
.138
1.089

df1
1
1

df2
35
34

Sig. F
Change
.217
.304

105
a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR East Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR East Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD

RQ3 – Eastern Europe and Central Asia
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party
affiliation of the president on the annual regional allocation for Eastern Europe and
Central Asia. The regional allocations for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (M =
23943.59, SD = 21544.761) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent
variable. Regional refugee totals for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (M = 892524.72,
SD = 802644.522) as reported by the UNHCR at the time the regional allocations were
finalized was entered into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party
affiliation of the president setting the final regional allocation (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for
Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the
independent variable.
To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook’s d values. The
critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook’s d critical value
was .111. No values exceeded the critical values for Mahalanobis d or Cook’s d.
Variance inflation factors were reviewed and found to be below the 10.0 threshold for
presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.234) and for total global refugees from Eastern
Europe and Central Asia (VIF = 1.234). The normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm
that the data were generally normally distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I
conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted values and the
absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was r = -.102 (p = .538),
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indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the necessary assumptions, the model was
reviewed, ΔF(1, 36) = .046, p = .831, ΔR2 = .001 (see Table 11). Because the model was
not significant, it was not interpreted. The model failed to disprove the null hypothesis for
RQ3 for Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
Table 11
Model Summary for RQ3 for Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Change Statistics

Model
1
2

R
.316a
.317b

R
Square
.100
.101

Adjusted
R
Square
.075
.051

Std. Error
of the
Estimate
20717.811
20990.176

R
Square
Change
.100
.001

F
Change
4.094
.046

df1
1
1

df2
37
36

Sig. F
Change
.050
.831

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Eastern Europe & Central Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Eastern Europe & Central Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO,
PresPartyPD

RQ3 – Near East and South Asia
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party
affiliation of the president on the annual regional allocation for the Near East and South
Asia region. The regional allocations for Near East and South Asia (M = 13835.90, SD =
12555.545) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent variable. Regional
refugee totals for Near East and South Asia ((M = 5288832.67, SD = 1904669.045) as
reported by the UNHCR at the time the regional allocations were finalized was entered
into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of the
president setting the final regional allocation (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for
each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the independent variable.
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Figure 1
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residuals (Dependent Variable: Regional
Allocation for Near East and South Asia)

To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook’s d values. The
critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook’s d critical value
was .111. No values exceeded the critical values for Mahalanobis d, but values for FY19
exceeded the critical value for Cook’s d at .114. FY19 was removed from the dataset and
hierarchical regression was conducted for the remaining FY81-FY18 fiscal years. After
conducting the hierarchical regression for FY81-FY18, VIFs were reviewed and were
found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.011) and
for total global refugees from Near East and South Asia (VIF = 1.011). The normal P-P
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plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed (see
Figure 1). To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the
standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson
correlation was r = .479 (p = .002), indicating heteroscedasticity.
Because the assumption of homoscedasticity was violated, a bootstrapped
hierarchical regression was conducted using the wild bootstrap method, with confidence
intervals based on BCa method. The bootstrap for coefficients was reviewed, and
presidential party affiliation was not found to be a statistically significant contributor to
the model (β = -11111.761, p = .008, 95%CI: -17725.682 and -4447.079) (see Table 12).
Table 12
Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ3 for Near East and South Asia
Bootstrapa
BCa 95% Confidence
Interval
Model
2

a.

(Constant)
UNHCR Near
East & South
Asia – At
Final PD/EO
PresPartyPD

B
4744.414
.003

Bias
-42.275
-7.537E-6

Std.
Error
4918.768
.001

Sig. (2tailed)
.303
.002

Lower
-3797.139
.001

Upper
13364.171
.005

11111.761

126.147

3682.325

.008

-18057.781

-3294.171

Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 2000 wild bootstrap samples

The model was also found to be significant (ΔF(1, 35) = 10.016, p = .003, ΔR2 = .192)
and was interpreted (see Table 13).
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Table 13
Model Summary for RQ3 for Near East and South Asia Regional Allocation
Change Statistics

Model
1
2

R
.368a
.572b

R
Square
.135
.328

Adjusted
R
Square
.111
.289

Std. Error
of the
Estimate
11970.692
10704.999

R
Square
Change
.135
.192

F
Change
5.636
10.016

df1
1
1

df2
36
35

Sig. F
Change
.023
.003

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD

ΔR2 can be interpreted to mean that presidential party affiliation accounts for
19.2% of variance in regional allocations set for Near East and South Asia. In addition,
Ŷ= a+ b1X1+b2X2 can be used to determine the difference in the expected regional
allocation for Near East and South Asia between a Democratic president and a
Republican president using the β-values of presidential party affiliation (β = -11111.761,
p = .008, 95%CI: -18057.781 and -3294.171) and regional refugee totals Near East and
South Asia (β = .003, p = .002, 95%CI: .001 and .005). The equation for the expected
Near East and South Asia regional allocation by a Democratic president was constructed
and simplified as follows:
(Ŷ|Democrat) = 4744.414 + .003(global regional refugees) + -11111.761(0)
(Ŷ|Democrat) = 4744.414 + .003(global regional refugees)
The equation for the expected Near East and South Asia regional allocation by a
Republican president was constructed and simplified as follows:
(Ŷ|Republican) = 4744.414 + .003(global regional refugees) + -11111.761(1)
(Ŷ|Republican) = 4744.414 + .003(global regional refugees) – 11111.761
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(Ŷ|Republican) = 4744.414 + .003(global regional refugees) – 11111.761
(Ŷ|Republican) = -6367.347 + .003(global regional refugees)
From these equations, we conclude that, all other things being equal, a Republican
president setting regional allocations predicts a 11,112 lower regional allocation for Near
East and South Asian refugees than a Democratic president.
RQ3 – Latin America and Caribbean
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party
affiliation of the president on the annual regional allocation for Latin America and
Caribbean. The regional allocations for Latin America and Caribbean (M = 13835.90, SD
= 12555.545) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent variable. Regional
refugee totals for Latin America and Caribbean (M = 415288.69, SD = 347076.332) as
reported by the UNHCR at the time the regional allocations were finalized was entered
into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of the
president setting the final regional allocation (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for
each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the independent variable.
To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook’s d values. The
critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook’s d critical value
was .111. No values exceeded the critical values for Mahalanobis d, but values for FY94
and FY95 exceeded the critical value for Cook’s d at .459 and .130, respectively. Both
FY94 and FY95 was removed from the dataset and hierarchical regression was conducted
for the remaining 37 fiscal years.
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I conducted a hierarchical regression for the FY81-FY19 excluding FY94-FY95,
then VIFs were reviewed and found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party
affiliation (VIF = 1.050) and for total global refugees from Latin America and Caribbean
(VIF = 1.050). The normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally
normally distributed (see Figure 2).
Figure 2
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residuals (Dependent Variable: Regional
Allocation for Latin American and Caribbean)

To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the
standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson
correlation was r = .852 (p = .032), indicating heteroscedasticity. Having met the
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necessary assumptions, the model was reviewed, ΔF(1, 34) = 10.348, p = .003, ΔR2 =
.231 (see Table 14). Because the model was significant, the model was interpreted.
Table 14
Model Summary for RQ3 for Latin America and Caribbean

Model
1
2

R
.104a
.491b

R
Square
.011
.242

Adjusted
R
Square
-.018
.197

Std.
Error of
the
Estimate
1263.096
1122.107

Change Statistics
R
Square
Change
.011
.231

F
Change
.379
10.348

df1
1
1

df2
35
34

Sig. F
Change
.542
.003

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At Final PD/EO
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD

ΔR2 can be interpreted to mean that presidential party affiliation accounts for
23.1% of variance in regional allocations set for Latin America and Caribbean. The
equation Ŷ= a+ b1X1+b2X2 can be used to determine the difference in the expected
regional allocation for Latin America and Caribbean between a Democratic president and
a Republican president using the β-values of presidential party affiliation (β = -1238.343,
t(34) = -.492, p = .003, 95%CI: -2020.676 and 456.009) and regional refugee totals for
Latin America and Caribbean (β = 1318E-5, t(34) = .004, p = .981, 95%CI: -.001 and
.001) (see Table 15).
Table 15
Coefficients for RQ3 for Latin America and Caribbean
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
2

(Constant)
UNHCR Latin
America & Caribbean
– At Final PD/EO
PresPartyPD

B
4345.805
1.318E-5

Std. Error
339.836
.001

-1238.343

384.960

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
.004

t
12.788
.024

Sig.
.000
.981

-.492

-3.217

.003
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The equation for the expected Latin America and Caribbean regional allocation
by a Democratic president was constructed and simplified to (Ŷ|Democrat) = 4345.805 +
1.318e-5(global regional refugees), while the equation for the expected Latin America
and Caribbean regional allocation by a Republican president was constructed and
simplified as (Ŷ|Republican) = 3107.462 + 1.318e-5 (global regional refugees). From
these equations, we conclude that, all other things being equal, a Republican president
setting regional allocations predicts a 1,238 lower allocation to Latin America and
Caribbean refugees than a Democratic president.
RQ3 – Africa
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party
affiliation of the president on the annual regional allocation for Africa. The regional
allocations for Africa (M = 12138.46, SD = 8429.916) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was
used as the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for Africa (M = 4079546.38, SD =
1246806.487) as reported by the UNHCR at the time the regional allocations were
finalized was entered into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party
affiliation of the president setting the final regional allocation (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for
Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the
independent variable.
To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook’s d values. The
critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook’s d critical value
was .111. No fiscal years had values exceeding the critical value of Mahalanobis d at
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24.641, but FY17 exceeded the critical value of Cook’s d at .321 and was removed from
the dataset. I completed a hierarchical regression for the remaining 38 fiscal years, and
VIFs were reviewed and found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party
affiliation (VIF = 1.003) and for total global refugees from Africa (VIF = 1.003). The
normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally
distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the
standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson
correlation was r = -.121 (p = .428), indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the
necessary assumptions, the model was reviewed, ΔF(1, 35) = .628, p = .433, ΔR2 = .017
(see Table 16). Because the model was not significant, it was not interpreted. The model
failed to disprove the null hypothesis for RQ3 for Africa.
Table 16
Model Summary for RQ3 for Africa

Model
1
2

R
.198a
.237b

R
Square
.039
.056

Adjusted
R
Square
-.012
-.002

Std.
Error of
the
Estimate
7600.072
7639.609

Change Statistics
R
Square
Change
.039
.017

F
Change
1.465
.628

df1
1
1

df2
36
35

Sig. F
Change
.234
.433

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Africa Refugees – At Final PD/EO
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Africa Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD

Research Question 4
RQ4: What is the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on
USRAP regional admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?
H04: The political party affiliation of the president has no statistically significant
effect on USRAP regional admissions.
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Ha4: The political party affiliation of the president has a statistically significant
effect on USRAP regional admissions.
I conducted a separate hierarchical regression analysis for each of the following
regions to assess the effect of the political party affiliation of the president on regional
admissions: East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Near East and South Asia, Latin
America and Caribbean, and Africa.
RQ4 – East Asia
I conducted hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party
affiliation of the president on regional admissions for East Asia. The regional admissions
for East Asia (M = 27423.23 SD = 25594.904) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the
dependent variable. Global refugee totals for East Asia (M = 943836.00, SD =
229083.859) as reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year partially overlapping the
federal fiscal year were entered into the first block as the controlling variable.
Presidential party affiliation of the president in office for all or most of the fiscal year
(0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the
second block as the independent variable.
To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook’s d values. The
critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ4 was 13.816, while the Cook’s d critical value
was .111. Values for FY18 and FY19 both exceeded the critical value of Mahalanobis d
at 14.414 and 14.255, respectively. Values for FY18 and FY19 also exceeded the critical
value of Cook’s d at .301 and .261, respectively, as did FY81 at .3169. FY81, FY18, and
FY19 were removed from the dataset, and I conducted hierarchical regression for the
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remaining 36 fiscal years. After conducting the hierarchical regression for FY82-FY17,
VIFs were reviewed and found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party
affiliation (VIF = 1.635) and for total global refugees from East Asia (VIF – 1.635). The
normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally
distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the
standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson
correlation was r = .619 (p < .001), indicating heteroscedasticity.
Because the assumption of homoscedasticity was violated, I conducted a
bootstrapped hierarchical regression using the wild bootstrap method, with confidence
intervals based on the BCa method. The bootstrap for
Table 17
Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ4 for East Asia
Bootstrapa
BCa 95% Confidence
Interval

Model
2

B
(Constant)
UNHCR East
Asia – At End
FY
PresPartyFY

a.

19336.773
.040

17366.612

Bias
-20356.318

Std. Error
50812.576

Sig.
(2tailed)
.785

.021

.052

.057

105977.106
-.051

4698.957

12227.092

.195

-5022.551

Lower

Upper
27355.102
.171

49820.407

Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 2000 wild bootstrap samples

coefficients was reviewed, and presidential party affiliation was not found to be a
statistically significant contributor to the model (β = 17366.612, p = .195, 95%CI: 5022.551 and 49820.407) (See Table 17). The model was found to be significant (ΔF(1,
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33) = 4.774, p = .036, ΔR2 = .126) and was interpreted (see Table 18). Presidential party
affiliation was not found to be a statistically significant contributor to refugee admissions
from East Asia in RQ4.
Table 18
Model Summary for RQ4 for East Asia
Change Statistics

Model
1
2

R
.015a
.356b

R
Square
.000
.127

Adjusted
R
Square
-.029
.074

Std. Error
of the
Estimate
19535.816
18534.140

R
Square
Change
.000
.126

F
Change
.008
4.774

df1
1
1

df2
34
33

Sig. F
Change
.929
.036

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR East Asia Refugees – At End FY
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR East Asia Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY

RQ4 – Eastern Europe and Central Asia
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party
affiliation of the president on regional admissions for Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
The regional admissions for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (M = 21650.21, SD =
20788.995) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent variable. Regional
refugee totals for Eastern Europe and Central Asia (M = 910385.64, SD = 807439.054) as
reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year partially overlapping the federal fiscal year
was entered into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of
the president in office for all or most of the fiscal year (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for
Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the
independent variable.
To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook’s d values. The
critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ4 was 13.816, while the Cook’s d critical value
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was .111. No values exceeded the critical values for Mahalanobis d or Cook’s d.
Pearson’s r was generated to screen for multicollinearity. Variance inflation factors were
found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.336) and
for total global refugees from Eastern Europe and Central Asia (VIF = 1.336). The
normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally
distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the
standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson
correlation was r = .066 (p = .699), indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the
necessary assumptions, the model was reviewed, ΔF(1, 36) = .297, p = .589, ΔR2 = .007
(see Table 19). Because the model was not significant, it was not interpreted. The model
failed to disprove the null hypothesis for RQ4 for Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
Table 19
Model Summary for RQ4 for Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Change Statistics

Model
1
2

R
.421a
.429b

R
Square
.177
.184

Adjusted
R
Square
.155
.138

Std. Error
of the
Estimate
19113.470
19297.787

R
Square
Change
.177
.007

F
Change
7.954
.297

df1
1
1

df2
37
36

Sig. F
Change
.008
.589

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Eastern Europe & Central Asia Refugees – At End FY
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Eastern Europe & Central Asia Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY

RQ4 – Near East and South Asia
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party
affiliation of the political party affiliation of the president on regional admissions for
Near East and South Asia. The regional admissions for Near East and South Asia (M =
11901.36, SD = 11439.865) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent
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variable. Regional refugee totals for Near East and South Asia (M = 5521419.10, SD =
1896562.065) as reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year partially overlapping the
federal fiscal year were entered into the first block as the controlling variable.
Presidential party affiliation of the president in office for all or most of the fiscal year
(0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the
second block as the independent variable.
To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook’s d values. The
critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook’s d critical value
was .111. No values exceeded the critical values for Mahalanobis d, but values for FY19
exceeded the critical value for Cook’s d at .185. FY19 was removed from the dataset, and
I conducted a hierarchical regression for the remaining FY81-FY18 fiscal years. After
conducting the hierarchical regression for FY81-FY18, VIFs were reviewed and were
found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation (VIF = 1.007) and
for total global refugees from Near East and South Asia (VIF = 1.007). The normal P-P
plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed (see
Figure 3).
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Figure 3
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residuals (Dependent Variable: Near East
and South Asia Admissions)

To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized
predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was r =
.355 (p = .029), indicating heteroscedasticity.
Because the assumption of homoscedasticity was violated, I conducted a
bootstrapped hierarchical regression using the wild bootstrap method, with confidence
intervals based on the BCa method. The bootstrap for coefficients was reviewed, and
presidential party affiliation was found to be a statistically significant contributor to the
model (β = -11886.197, p = .002, 95%CI: -19246.045 and -4094.144) (see Table 20). The
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model was also found to be significant (ΔF(1, 35) = 14.752, p < .001, ΔR2 = .270) and
was interpreted (see Table 21).
Table 20
Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ4 for Near East and South Asia
Bootstrapa
BCa 95% Confidence
Interval

Model
2

a.

(Constant)
UNHCR Near
East & South
Asia – At End
FY
PresPartyFY

B
6932.176
.002

Bias
-2133.886
.000

Std. Error
6827.585
.001

Sig.
(2tailed)
.391
.057

11986.187

364.281

3384.019

.002

Lower
-4813.157
.000

Upper
14302.155
.005

-19246.045

-4094.144

Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 2000 wild bootstrap samples

Table 21
Model Summary for RQ4 for Near East and South Asia
Change Statistics

Model
1
2

R
.297a
.599b

R
Square
.088
.359

Adjusted
R
Square
.063
.322

Std. Error
of the
Estimate
11126.383
9464.504

R
Square
Change
.088
.270

F
Change
3.485
14.752

df1
1
1

df2
36
35

Sig. F
Change
.070
.000

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At End FY
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY

ΔR2 can be interpreted to mean that presidential party affiliation accounts for 27.0% of
variance in regional allocations set for Near East and South Asia. The equation Ŷ= a+
b1X1+b2X2 can be used to determine the difference in the expected regional admissions
for Near East and South Asia between a Democratic president’s term and a Republican
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president’s term, using the β-values of presidential party affiliation (β = -11986.197, p =
.002, 95%CI: -19246.045 and -4094.144) and regional refugee totals for Near East and
South Asia (β = .002, p = .057, 95%CI: .000 and .005). The equation for the expected
Near East and South Asia regional admissions under a Democratic president was
constructed and simplified to (Ŷ|Democrat) = 6932.176 + .002(global regional refugees),
while the equation for the expected Near East and South Asia regional admissions under
a Republican president was constructed and simplified as (Ŷ|Republican) = -5054.021 +
.002 (global regional refugees). From these equations, we conclude that, all other things
being equal, a Republican president’s term will predict 11,986 fewer admissions from
Near East and South Asia than a Democratic president’s term.
RQ4 – Latin America and Caribbean
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party
affiliation of the president on regional admissions for Latin America and Caribbean. The
regional admissions for Latin America and Caribbean (M = 2686.8, SD = 1826.111) for
each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for
Latin America and Caribbean (M = 400088.18, SD = 318127.744) as reported by the
UNHCR for the calendar year partially overlapping the federal fiscal year were entered
into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of the
president in office for all or most of the fiscal year (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican)
for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second block as the independent variable.
To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook’s d values. The
critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook’s d critical value
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was .111. No values exceeded the critical values for Mahalanobis d, but values for FY05
and FY95 exceeded the critical value for Cook’s d at .217 and .155, respectively. Both
FY05 and FY95 was removed from the dataset, and I conducted a hierarchical regression
for the remaining 37 fiscal years. After conducting the second hierarchical regression,
VIFs were reviewed and were found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party
affiliation (VIF = 1.010) and for total global refugees from Latin America and Caribbean
(VIF = 1.010). The normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally
normally distributed (see Figure 4).
Figure 4
Normal P-P Plot of Regression Standardized Residuals (Dependent Variable: Latin
America and Caribbean Admissions)

To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized
predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was r = -
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.049 (p = .774), indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the necessary assumptions, the
model was reviewed, ΔF(1, 34) = 13.238, p = .001, ΔR2 = .278 (see Table 22). Because
the model was significant, the model can be interpreted.
Table 22
Model Summary for RQ4 for Latin America and Caribbean

Model
1
2

R
.093a
.535b

R
Square
.009
.286

Adjusted
R
Square
-.020
.244

Std.
Error of
the
Estimate
1542.783
1327.989

Change Statistics
R
Square
Change
.009
.278

F
Change
.303
13.238

df1
1
1

df2
35
34

Sig. F
Change
.585
.001

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At End FY
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY

ΔR2 can be interpreted to mean that presidential party affiliation accounts for
27.8% of variance in regional allocations set for Latin America and Caribbean. The
equation Ŷ= a+ b1X1+b2X2 can be used to determine the difference in the expected
regional admissions for Latin America and Caribbean between a Democratic president’s
term and a Republican president’s term using the β-values of presidential party affiliation
(β = -.530, p = .001, 95%CI: -2533.884 and -717.689) and regional refugee totals for
Latin America and Caribbean (β = .001, p = .327, 95%CI: -.001 and .002) (see Table 23).
Table 23
Coefficients for RQ4 for Latin America and Caribbean
Unstandardized Coefficients
Model
2

(Constant)
UNHCR Latin
America & Caribbean
Refugees – At End FY
PresPartyFY

B
3125.422
.001

Std. Error
431.082
.001

-1625.786

446.845

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta
.145

t
7.250
.995

Sig.
.000
.327

-.530

-3.638

.001
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The equation for the expected Latin America and Caribbean regional allocation under a
Democratic president was constructed and simplified to (Ŷ|Democrat) = 3125.422 +
.001(global regional refugees), while the equation for the expected Latin America and
Caribbean regional allocation under a Republican president was constructed and
simplified as (Ŷ|Republican) = 1499.636 + .001(global regional refugees). From these
equations, we conclude that, all other things being equal, a Republican president’s term
predicts 1,450 fewer admissions per fiscal year from Latin America and Caribbean than a
Democratic president’s term.
RQ4 – Africa
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine the effect of political party
affiliation of the president on regional admissions for Africa. The regional admissions for
Africa (M = 10369.38, SD = 7964.187) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was used as the
dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for Africa (M = 4188248.82, SD =
1319980.553) as reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year overlapping the start of
the fiscal year was entered into the first block as the controlling variable. Presidential
party affiliation of the president in office for all or most of the fiscal year (0.0 for
Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19) was entered into the second
block as the independent variable.
To screen for outliers, I generated Mahalanobis d and Cook’s d values. The
critical value for Mahalanobis d for RQ3 was 13.816, while the Cook’s d critical value
was .111. No fiscal years had values exceeding the critical value of Mahalanobis d, but
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values for FY16 and FY04 exceeded the critical value of Cook’s d at .168 and .122,
respectively, and were removed from the dataset.
A hierarchical regression was completed for the remaining 37 fiscal years, then
VIFs were reviewed and were found to be below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party
affiliation (VIF = 1.005) and for total global refugees from Africa (VIF = 1.005). The
normal P-P plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally
distributed. To test for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the
standardized predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson
correlation was r = -.327 (p = .045), indicating heteroscedasticity.
Because the assumption of homoscedasticity was violated, I conducted a
bootstrapped hierarchical regression using the wild bootstrap method, with confidence
intervals based on the BCa method. The bootstrap for coefficients was reviewed, and
presidential party affiliation was not found to be a statistically significant contributor to
the model (β = -3019.932, p = .181, 95%CI: -6485.009 and -500.106) (see Table 24).
Table 24
Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ4 for Africa
Bootstrapa
BCa 95% Confidence
Interval

Model
2

a.

(Constant)
UNHCR
Africa - At
End FY
PresPartyFY

B
11683.376
.000

Bias
1475.680
.000

Std. Error
4239.065
.001

Sig.
(2tailed)
.009
.897

-3019.932

-464.780

2129.120

.181

Lower
3344.971
-.002

Upper
23409.619
.001

-6485.009

-500.106

Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 2000 wild bootstrap samples
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The model was found to be significant (ΔF(1, 35) = 14.752, p < .001, ΔR2 = .270) and
was interpreted (see Table 25). Presidential party affiliation was not found to be a
statistically significant contributor to refugee admissions from Africa in RQ4.
Table 25
Model Summary for RQ4 for Africa

Model
1
2

R
.012a
.228b

R
Square
.000
.052

Adjusted
R
Square
-.028
-.004

Std.
Error of
the
Estimate
6684.901
6604.767

Change Statistics
R
Square
Change
.000
.052

F
Change
.005
1.854

df1
1
1

df2
35
34

Sig. F
Change
.943
.182

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Africa Refugees – At End FY
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Africa Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY

Research Question 5
RQ5: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the USRAP annual
admissions ceiling, when controlling for global refugee totals?
H05: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on
USRAP annual admissions ceiling.
Ha5: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on the
USRAP annual admissions ceiling.
In RQ1, no effect of presidential party affiliation was found on the annual
admissions ceiling, meaning that there is no effect to test for the extent of moderation by
the Senate and House majorities. Therefore, no statistical tests were conducted for RQ5.
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Research Question 6
RQ6: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total annual admissions
through the USRAP, when controlling for global refugee totals?
H06: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total
annual admissions through the USRAP.
Ha6: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on total
annual admissions through the USRAP.
In RQ2, no effect of presidential party affiliation was found on the annual refugee
admissions through the USRAP, meaning that there is no effect to test for the extent of
moderation by the Senate and House majorities. Therefore, no statistical tests were
conducted for RQ6.
Research Question 7
RQ7: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional
allocations, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?
H07: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on
USRAP regional allocations.
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Ha7: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on
USRAP regional allocations.
In RQ3, presidential party affiliation was found to effect regional allocations only
for Near East and South Asia and Latin America and Caribbean. I conducted separate
hierarchical regression analyses for Near East and South Asia and Latin America and
Caribbean to determine the moderating effect of the Senate and House majorities on
regional allocations for each of these regions. As RQ3 found that party affiliation of the
president had no effect on regional allocations for East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central
Asia, and Africa, no statistical analyses were performed for these regions, as there was no
effect to moderate.
RQ7 – Near East and South Asia
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine whether the party affiliations of
the Senate and House majorities moderate effect of political party affiliation of the
president on the annual regional allocation for Near East and South Asia. The regression
was conducted with data from FY81-FY18, as FY19 data was removed from the dataset
in RQ3 for exceeding the critical value for Cook’s d. The regional allocations for Near
East and South Asia (M = 13963.16, SD = 12698.567) (see Table 26) for each FY (FY81FY18) was used as the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for Near East and
South Asia (M = 5164992.84, SD = 1763953.167) (see Table 26) as reported by the
UNHCR at the time the regional allocations were finalized was entered into the first
block as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of the president setting the
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final regional allocation (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81FY18) was entered into the second block as the independent variable. Party affiliation of
the Senate majority at the time regional allocations were set (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for
Republican) and party affiliation of the House majority at the time regional allocations
were set, expressed as Senate majority x House majority, for each FY (FY81-FY18) was
entered into the third block as the moderating variable.
Table 26
Regional Allocations and Regional Refugee Totals for Near East and South Asia,
Excluding FY19
RA – Near East & South Asia
UNHCR – Near East & South Asia –
at Final PD/EO

N
38
38

Minimum
2500
600670

Maximum
40000
8979185

M
13963.16
5164992.84

SD
12698.567
1763953.167

Variance inflation factors were below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation
(VIF = 1.071), for total global refugees from Near East and South Asia (VIF = 1.015),
and for Senate majority x House majority (VIF = 1.068). The normal P-P plot was
reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed. To test for
homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted
values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was r = .530 (p =
.001), indicating heteroscedasticity.
Because the assumption of homoscedasticity was violated, I conducted a
bootstrapped hierarchical regression using the wild bootstrap method, with confidence
intervals based on the BCa method. The bootstrap for coefficients was reviewed, and
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Senate majority x House majority was not found to be a statistically significant
contributor to the model (β = -6265.272, p = .074, 95%CI: -12247.629 and -897.508) (see
Table 27).
Table 27
Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ7 for Near East and South Asia
Bootstrapa
BCa 95% Confidence
Interval

Model
3

(Constant)
UNHCR Near
East & South
Asia – At
Final PD/EO
PresPartyPD
Senate x
House
Majority at
PD

a.

B
8247.286
.003

Bias
467.284
-5.757E-5

Std. Error
4176.299
.001

Sig.
(2tailed)
.090
.002

12528.370
-6265.272

-143.177

3413.530

.002

-19367.446

-6041.229

-259.552

3065.433

.074

-12247.629

-.897.508

Lower
-949.584
.002

Upper
17927.591
.004

Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 2000 wild bootstrap samples

The model was not found to be significant (ΔF(1, 34) = 2.892, p = .098, ΔR2 =
.053) and was not interpreted (see Table 28). Senate and House majority party affiliations
were not shown to be significant for Near East and South Asia in RQ7.
Table 28
Model Summary for RQ7 for Near East and South Asia
Change Statistics

Model
1
2
3

R
.368a
.572b
.617c

R
Square
.135
.328
.380

Adjusted
R
Square
.111
.289
.326

Std. Error
of the
Estimate
11970/692
10704.999
10426.954

R
Square
Change
.135
.192
.053

F
Change
5.636
10.016
2.892

df1
1
1
1

df2
36
35
34

Sig. F
Change
.023
.003
.098
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a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD
c. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD,
Senate x House Majority at PD

RQ7 – Latin America and Caribbean
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine whether the party affiliations of
the Senate and House majorities moderate effect of political party affiliation of the
president on the annual regional allocation for Latin America and Caribbean. The
regression was conducted with data from FY81-FY19 with FY94-FY95 excluded, as
FY94-FY95 data was removed from the dataset in RQ3 for exceeding the critical value
for Cook’s d. The regional allocations for Latin America and Caribbean (M = 3614.86,
SD = 1252.157) (see Table 29) for each FY (FY81-FY18) was used as
Table 29
Regional Allocations & Regional Refugee Totals for Latin America and Caribbean,
Excluding FY94-FY95
RA – Latin America & Caribbean
UNHCR – Latin America &
Caribbean – at Final PD/EO

N
37
37

Minimum
1000
83710

Maximum
6000
1243412

M
3614.86
407596.62

SD
1252.157
343399.162

the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for Latin America and Caribbean (M =
407596.62, SD = 343399.162) (see Table 29) as reported by the UNHCR at the time the
regional allocations were finalized was entered into the first block as the controlling
variable. Presidential party affiliation of the president setting the final regional allocation
(0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19; FY94-FY95 excluded)
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was entered into the second block as the independent variable. Party affiliation of the
Senate majority at the time regional allocations were set (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for
Republican) and party affiliation of the House majority at the time regional allocations
were set, expressed as Senate majority x House majority, for each FY (FY81-FY18) was
entered into the third block as the moderating variable.
Variance inflation factors were below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party
affiliation (VIF = 1.089), for total global refugees from Latin America and Caribbean
(VIF = 1.275), and for Senate majority x House majority (VIF = 1.305). To test for
homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted
values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was r = .779 (p =
.048), indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the necessary assumptions, the model
was reviewed, ΔF(1, 33) = .010, p = .919, ΔR2 = .000 (see Table 30).
Table 30
Model Summary for RQ7 for Latin America and Caribbean

Model
1
2
3

R
.104a
.491b
.492c

R
Square
.011
.242
.242

Adjusted
R
Square
-.018
.197
.173

Std.
Error of
the
Estimate
1263.096
1122.107
1138.802

Change Statistics
R
Square
Change
.011
.231
.000

F
Change
.379
10.348
.010

df1
1
1
1

df2
35
34
33

Sig. F
Change
.542
.003
.919

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At Final PD/EO
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD
c. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At Final PD/EO, PresPartyPD,
Senate x House Majority at PD
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Because the model was not significant, it was not interpreted. The model failed to
disprove the null hypothesis for RQ7 for Latin America and Caribbean.
Research Question 8
RQ8: Does the political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities
moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on USRAP regional
admissions, when controlling for global refugee totals by region?
H08: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do not
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on
USRAP regional admissions.
Ha8: The political party affiliations of the Senate and House majorities do
significantly moderate the effect of presidential political party affiliation on
USRAP regional admissions.
In RQ4, presidential party affiliation was found to effect regional admissions only
for Near East and South Asia and Latin America and Caribbean. I conducted separate
hierarchical regression analyses for Near East and South Asia and Latin America and
Caribbean to determine the moderating effect of the Senate and House majorities on
regional admissions for each of these regions. As RQ4 found that party affiliation of the
president had no effect on regional admissions for East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central
Asia, nor Africa, no statistical analyses were performed for these regions, as there was no
effect to moderate.
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RQ8 – Near East and South Asia
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine whether the party affiliations of
the Senate and House majorities moderate effect of political party affiliation of the
president on the annual regional admissions for Near East and South Asia. The regression
was conducted with data from FY81-FY18, as FY19 was excluded from the dataset for
exceeding the critical value of Cook’s d. The regional admissions for Near East and
South Asia (M = 12140.84, SD = 11493.928) (see Table 31) for each FY (FY81-FY18)
was used as the dependent variable. Regional refugee totals for Near East and South Asia
(M = 5391977.789, SD = 1738693.374) (see Table 31) as reported by the UNHCR for the
calendar year overlapping the start of the federal fiscal year.
Table 31
Regional Admissions and Regional Refugee Totals for Near East and South Asia,
Excluding FY19
RA – Near East & South Asia
UNHCR – Near East & South Asia –
at End FY

N
38
38

Minimum
2854
1836452

Maximum
38280
9994746

M
12140.84
5391977.789

SD
11493.928
1738693.374

Presidential party affiliation of the president in office for all or most of the fiscal year
(0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY18) was entered into the
second block as the independent variable. Party affiliation of the Senate majority for all
or most of the fiscal year (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) and party affiliation of
the House majority for all or most of the fiscal year, expressed as Senate majority party x
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House majority party, for each FY (FY81-FY18) was entered into the third block as the
moderating variable.
Variance inflation factors were well below the 10.0 threshold for presidential
party affiliation (VIF = 1.041), for total global refugees from Near East and South Asia
(VIF = 1.010), and for Senate majority x House majority (VIF = 1.037). The normal P-P
plot was reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed. To test
for homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized
predicted values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was r =
.592 (p < .001), indicating heteroscedasticity.
Because the assumption of homoscedasticity was violated, I conducted a
bootstrapped hierarchical regression using the wild bootstrap method, with confidence
intervals based on the BCa method. The bootstrap for coefficients was reviewed, and
Senate majority x House majority was not found to be a statistically significant
contributor to the model (β = -6265.272, p = .074, 95%CI: -12247.629 and -897.508) (see
Table 32).
Table 32
Bootstrap for Coefficients for RQ8 for Near East and South Asia
Bootstrapa
BCa 95% Confidence
Interval

Model
3

(Constant)
UNHCR Near
East & South
Asia – At End
FY

B
10628.218
.002

Bias
-1767.141
.000

Std. Error
5797.885
.001

Sig.
(2tailed)
.129
.040

Lower
632.677
.000

Upper
16603.817
.005
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PresPartyFY
Senate x
House
Majority at
FY
a.

13132.978
-6451.501

327.139

3237.317

.002

-19816.634

-5325.222

567.017

3127.111

.063

-13078.613

1456.577

Unless otherwise noted, bootstrap results are based on 2000 wild bootstrap samples

The model was found to be significant (ΔF(1, 34) = 4.469, p = .042, ΔR2 = .075) and was
interpreted (see Table 33). Senate and House majority party affiliations were not shown
to be significant for Near East and South Asia in RQ8.
Table 33
Model Summary for RQ8 for Near East and South Asia
Change Statistics

Model
1
2
3

R
.297a
.599b
.658c

R
Square
.088
.359
.433

Adjusted
R
Square
.063
.322
.383

Std. Error
of the
Estimate
11126.383
9464.504
9027.657

R
Square
Change
.088
.270
.075

F
Change
3.485
14.752
4.469

df1
1
1
1

df2
36
35
34

Sig. F
Change
.070
.000
.042

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At End FY
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY
c. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Near East & South Asia Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY, Senate x
House for FY

RQ8 – Latin America and Caribbean
I conducted a hierarchical regression to determine whether the party affiliations of
the Senate and House majorities moderate effect of political party affiliation of the
president on the annual regional admissions for Latin America and Caribbean. The
regression was conducted with data from FY81-FY19 with FY95 and FY05 excluded
from the dataset as they exceeded the critical value of Cook’s d. The regional admissions
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for Latin America and Caribbean (M = 2444.84, SD = 1527.785) (see Table 34) for each
FY (FY81-FY19, excluding FY95 and FY05) was used as the dependent variable.
Regional refugee totals for Latin America and Caribbean (M = 414221.03 SD =
320506.664) (see Table 34) as reported by the UNHCR for the calendar year overlapping
the start of the federal fiscal year for each FY (FY81-FY19, excluding FY95 and FY05)
was entered into the first box as the controlling variable. Presidential party affiliation of
the president in office for all or most of the fiscal year (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for
Republican) for each FY (FY81-FY19, excluding FY95 and FY05) was entered into the
second block as the independent variable. Party affiliation of the Senate majority for all
or most of the fiscal year (0.0 for Democrat, 1.0 for Republican) and party affiliation of
the House majority for all or most of the fiscal year, expressed as Senate majority x
House majority, for each FY (FY81-FY19, excluding FY95 and FY05) was entered into
the third block as the moderating variable.
Table 34
Regional Admissions and Regional Refugee Total for Latin America and Caribbean,
Excluding FY94-FY95
RA – Latin America & Caribbean
UNHCR – Latin America &
Caribbean – at End FY

N
37
37

Minimum
131
83710

Maximum
6156
1243412

M
2444.84
414221.03

SD
1527.785
320506.664

Variance inflation factors were below the 10.0 threshold for presidential party affiliation
(VIF = 1.041), for total global refugees from Latin America and Caribbean (VIF =
1.270), and for Senate majority x House majority (VIF = 1.310). The normal P-P plot was
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reviewed to confirm that the data were generally normally distributed. To test for
homoscedasticity, I conducted a correlation analysis between the standardized predicted
values and the absolute standardized residuals; the Pearson correlation was r = -.085 (p =
.616), indicating homoscedasticity. Having met the necessary assumptions, the model
was reviewed, ΔF(1, 33) = .787, p = .382, ΔR2 = .017 (see Table 35). Because the model
was not significant, it was not interpreted. The model failed to disprove the null
hypothesis for RQ8 for Latin America and Caribbean.
Table 35
Model Summary for RQ8 for Latin America & Caribbean

Model
1
2
3

R
.093a
.535b
.550c

R
Square
.009
.286
.303

Adjusted
R
Square
-.020
.244
.240

Std.
Error of
the
Estimate
1542.783
1327.989
1332.174

Change Statistics
R
Square
Change
.009
.278
.017

F
Change
.303
13.238
.787

df1
1
1
1

df2
35
34
33

Sig. F
Change
.585
.001
.382

a. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At End FY
b. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY
c. Predictors: (Constant), UNHCR Latin America & Caribbean Refugees – At End FY, PresPartyFY,
Senate x House for FY

Summary
Regression analysis of RQ1, the effect of presidential party affiliation on the
annual refugee ceiling, failed to disprove the null hypothesis that presidential party
affiliation has no significant effect on the annual refugee ceiling. Likewise, analysis of
the regression model for RQ2, the effect of presidential party affiliation on total annual
admissions, failed to disprove the null hypothesis that presidential party affiliation has no
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significant effect on annual refugee admissions. With no effect of presidential party
affiliation on the refugee ceiling or total annual admissions found in RQ1 and RQ2, no
effect existed to moderate and RQ5 and RQ6 were rendered moot.
Analysis for RQ3, the effect of presidential party affiliation on regional
allocations, showed mixed results. Analysis failed to disprove the null hypothesis for
regional allocations for East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Africa that
presidential party affiliation has no effect on regional allocations. A significant effect was
shown for Near East and South Asia, with analysis finding that a Republican president
setting regional allocations predicts a regional allocation 11,112 lower for the Near East
and South Asia than a Democratic president. A significant effect was also shown for
Latin America and Caribbean, with analysis finding that a Republican president setting
regional allocations predicts a regional allocation 1,238 lower for Latin America and
Caribbean than a Democratic president.
Mixed results were also found for different regions in RQ4, the effect of
presidential party affiliation on regional admissions. Analysis failed to disprove the null
hypothesis that presidential party affiliation has no effect for East Asia, Eastern Europe
and Central Asia, and Africa. Analysis also found that a Republican president’s term
predicts 11,986 fewer admissions from Near East and South Asia than a Democratic
president’s term. Similarly, a Republican president’s term was found to predict 1,450
fewer admissions from Latin America and the Caribbean than a Democratic president’s
term.

141
Moderation analysis was conducted for RQ7 on regional allocations for Near East
and South Asia as well as Latin America and Caribbean, the two regions in which
significant effect for presidential party affiliation was found in RQ3. In analyzing the
moderating effect of the Senate and House majorities on the effect of presidential party
affiliation on regional allocations, analysis failed to disprove the null hypothesis that the
Senate and House majorities do not moderate presidential party affiliation on regional
allocations.
For RQ8, moderation analysis was conducted to examine the moderating effect of
Senate and House majorities on presidential party affiliation on regional admissions from
Near East and South Asia and Latin America and Caribbean, the two regions in which
significant effect for presidential party affiliation was found in RQ4. In analyzing the
moderating effect of the Senate and House majorities on the effect of presidential party
affiliation on regional admissions, analysis failed to disprove the null hypothesis that the
Senate and House majorities do not moderate presidential party affiliation on regional
admissions.
In Chapter 5, I will discuss these findings as they relate to the literature presented
in Chapter 2 and analyze these findings within the theoretical framework of historical
institutionalism. Chapter 5 will also include discussion of limitations in this study with
recommendations for future study and will conclude with a discussion of the implications
of this study for positive social change.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to examine the effect of the president’s political
party affiliation on proposed refugee admissions, as outlined in the annual admissions
ceilings and regional allocations, and actual refugee admissions through the USRAP,
while controlling for global refugee numbers, in aggregate and by region. I also sought to
determine the moderating effect of the political party affiliations of the Senate and House
majorities This quantitative study was nonexperimental and correlative in design, relying
on hierarchical regression analysis to answer the study’s RQs, with the intention of
assisting resettlement agencies in anticipating and preparing for future refugee
admissions.
I found that presidential party affiliation had no significant effect on the annual
admissions ceiling or on total annual refugee admissions. Presidential party affiliation
also had no significant effect on regional allocations for East Asia, Eastern Europe and
Central Asia, or Africa. Having a Republican president set regional allocations, however,
predicted a regional allocation 11,112 lower for the Near East and South Asia and a
regional allocation 1,238 lower for Latin America and Caribbean. Likewise, a Republican
president’s term predicted 11,986 fewer admissions from Near East and South Asia and
1,450 fewer admissions from Latin America and the Caribbean.
I analyzed the moderating effect of the party affiliations of the Senate and House
majorities only for those regions for which presidential party affiliation was shown to
have a significant effect that could potentially be moderated. Senate and House majority
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affiliation was shown to have no significant moderating effect on regional allocations for
Near East and South Asia or Latin America and the Caribbean. Similarly, Senate and
House majority party affiliation was also shown to have no significant moderating effect
on admissions from Near East and South Asia or Latin America and the Caribbean.
Interpretation of the Findings
Resettlement agencies and human rights organizations have long held that the
USRAP holds bipartisan support (Human Rights First, n.d.; USCRI, 2017). This
contention was supported, at a macrolevel, in this study in that presidential party
affiliation was found to have no significant effect on the annual admissions ceiling or on
annual refugee admissions in the aggregate. When looking at regional allocations and
admissions, however, bipartisan support waned. Democratic presidents were found to
have greater levels of support for refugees from Near East and South Asia as well as
Latin America and the Caribbean, as having a Democratic president predicts a 11,112
higher ceiling and 11,986 more admissions from Near East and South Asia and a 1,238
higher ceiling and 1,450 more admissions from Latin America and the Caribbean than a
Republican president. It is not inaccurate, then, to state that the USRAP has bipartisan
support, but the caveat is that the regional makeup of refugees admitted through the
USRAP has statistically significant differences under presidents of different parties.
When the Refugee Act of 1980 was first proposed to Congress, opponents of the
Refugee Act argued that it would undermine the existing immigration policies that
favored Europeans (Scribner 2017, p. 268). This study found that an average of 74, 031
refugees were admitted annually between FY81-FY19. This average constitutes less than
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8% of all legal immigrants to the United States in those same years (U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, 2020). At these admissions levels, the refugee program is unlikely to
tip the scales of immigration in any significant direction related to European versus nonEuropean immigration overall.
Proponents of the Refugee Act praised the act as a mechanism for giving “greater
and more explicit power…with regard to the numbers and nature of refugees to be
admitted to [the United States]” (H.R Rep. No. 69-2, at 4500 (1980)). In this study, I
specifically examined the extent to which Congress moderated the effect of presidential
party affiliation on refugee admissions, rather than all possible ways in which Congress
could affect “the numbers and nature of refugees” admitted to the United States. Within
the parameters of this study, however, Congress was not shown to moderate the effect of
presidential party affiliation on proposed or actual refugee admissions.
I noted in Chapter 2 that much of the literature on refugee policy and admissions
addresses legislation enacted by Congress, examining motivations for legislation, results
of legislation, and partisan voting records (Akbari & MacDonald, 2014; Brown &
Scribner, 2014; Fussell, 2014; Kerwin, 2018; Martin & Ferris, 2017; Steil & Vasi, 2014;
Teitelbaum, 1980; Triadafilopoulos, 2010; Welch, 2014; Zolberg, 1998), despite the fact
that refugee admissions to the United States are based on presidential determination
rather than on Congressional legislation. This study has demonstrated that presidential
party affiliation does not affect the annual admissions ceiling or annual admissions, but
does affect regional allocations and admissions, with Democratic rather than Republican
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presidents predicting increased allocations to and admissions from the Near East and
South Asia region and the Latin America and Caribbean region.
Another gap in the literature identified in Chapter 2 was the difference between
political rhetoric on refugee policy and political actions that affect refugee admissions. In
spite of the restrictionist rhetoric among Republican politicians (Fennelly et al., 2015;
Fussell, 2014), the overall admissions ceiling and annual refugee admissions were not
significantly affected by the party affiliation of the president, meaning that Republican
presidents had no significant effect on reducing the admissions ceiling or refugee
admissions to the United States. In line with Republican rhetoric against Latinx
immigrant and Muslim immigrants, however, Republican presidents predict lower
regional allocations and fewer refugee admissions from Latin America and the Caribbean
and Near East and South Asia. Although the overall refugee program maintained integrity
regardless of the president’s political affiliation, refugees from specific regions were
significantly affected by the president’s party. These results aligned with the rhetoric of
each party.
Reny (2017) demonstrated that Republican candidates are more likely to rely on
anti-immigrant appeals to gain support than Democratic candidates (p. 736). The
Democratic Party has shown greater support for Latinx immigrants (Hajal & Rivera,
2014) and Muslim immigrants (Doucerain et al., 2018; Newman, 2018) than the
Republican Party. It is noteworthy, then, that Republican presidents are a predictor of
lower regional allocations and admissions from both Latin America and the Caribbean
and Near East and South Asia. Although not all countries in Near East and South Asia are

146
Muslim-majority countries, 81% are, which is the highest percentage of Muslim-majority
countries in a single region, comparted to 33% in both Africa and Eastern Europe and
Central Asia, 9% in East Asia, and 0% in Latin America and Caribbean, according to the
CIA World Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021).
This reduction of immigrants from the Near East and South Asia, the region with
the greatest percentage of Muslim-majority countries, aligns with positions held by both
rank and file Republicans, as well as Republican politicians. Long before opposition to
Muslim refugees became a talking point for Republican presidential primary candidates
in 2016 (Nagel, 2016; Scribner, 2017), Muslim and other Middle Eastern refugees had
been a security concern to Republican politicians since the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Barkdull
et al., 2012; Disney, 2017). One study showed that 73% of Republicans agreed that
banning Muslim immigrants was needed to prevent terrorism (Schmidt, 2019) and for
certain Americans, Muslim refugees pose economic, security, and cultural threats
(Breshnahan et al., 2018). The reductions in refugee admissions from the Near East and
South Asia region under Republican administrations highlights one way in which these
views of Muslims are carried out in a tangible form.
Recent literature has focused on refugee policy under the Trump administration,
with cuts to the admissions ceiling drawing significant attention (Ferwerda et al., 2017;
Fullerton, 2017; Kerwin, 2018; Scriber, 2017). Despite cuts to the admissions ceiling and
refugee admissions under the Trump administration, only FY81, under the Carter (D)
administration for the setting of the refugee ceiling and Reagan (R) administration for the
majority of the fiscal year of arrivals, was found to be a statistical outlier when
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conducting regression analyses for RQ1 and RQ2. Historical institutionalism views
radical changes within institutions, such as political parties, as either resulting from the
accumulation of gradual changes over time (Fioretos, 2011; Sorensen, 2015) or as the
result of an exogenous shock (Fioretos, 2011). Trump’s approach to U.S. refugee policy
has largely been treated as an exogenous shock by the existing literature. The findings of
this study, however, indicate that Trump’s admissions ceilings FY17-FY19 and refugee
admissions FY17-FY19 were not statistical outliers and show that, even when accounting
for FY17-FY19, presidential party affiliation had no significant effect on the admissions
ceiling or refugee admissions.
Trump’s regional allocations were, generally, not found to be outliers, either.
Only the regional allocations for Near East and South Asia in FY19 and East Asia in
FY19 were found to be outliers when both values exceeded the critical value for Cook’s
d. After excluding these outliers, however, only regional allocations for Near East and
South Asia were found to be significantly affected by presidential party affiliation, with
lower allocations predicted by a Republican president. The predictive value of a
Republican presidency on Near East and South Asian refugee allocations indicates that
Trump’s outlier for that specific regional allocation in FY19 was not a total departure
from the history of the Republican Party. Although the FY19 Near East and South Asia
regional allocation was an outlier, a history of significantly lower allocations to the Near
East and South Asia by Republican presidents points to the accumulation of actions over
the history of the USRAP as the cause for Trump’s outlier of an allocation to that region,
rather than a radical change in direction.
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Regional allocations for East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Africa
were all found to be unaffected by presidential party affiliation, even when accounting for
allocations by the Trump administration. Although regional allocations for Latin America
and the Caribbean were affected by presidential party affiliation, none of Trump’s
regional allocations for Latin America and Caribbean were found to be outliers. When
considering the whole of the USRAP’s history, Republican presidents were correlated
with lower allocations to Latin America and the Caribbean, and Trump is not found to be
anomalous.
FY18 and FY19 admissions from Near East and South Asia, both under the
Trump administration, were outliers, as they exceeded the critical value of Mahalanobis
d. Even without including these years of the Trump administration, however, Republican
presidents were correlated with lower arrivals from Near East and South Asia. Like the
outliers for regional allocations found under the Trump administrations, these outliers in
regional admissions follow a pattern of lower admissions under Republican
administrations, rather than a shift in direction under the Trump presidency.
Limitations
This study was limited to the Senate and House majorities, rather than looking at
individual members of the Senate and House Committees on the Judiciary and their
relative influence on their respective committees. I also did not account for the nature of
the relationships between individual members and the president. This study was also
limited in that its analysis was of Congressional majorities as Senate majority x House
majority rather than the Senate and House independently.
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This study was also limited to the analysis of the effect of political party
affiliation. I did not consider external political factors that could be confounding
variables, such as U.S. military engagement, which has shown to affect global refugee
situations and U.S. refugee resettlement (Berman, 2011). The use of global refugee levels
and the number of total refugees by region as control variables in this study does partially
address changes to the global climate related to refugees but does not address political
events specifically. By taking data from each year since the passage of the Refugee Act
of 1980, FY81-FY19 and each year of global refugee data for calendar years 1979-2018
from the UNHCR, outcomes of this study are valid as the entire population being studied
was available rather than a sample of the population.
Because PRM’s regional groupings of countries changed over time, each FY
(FY81-FY03) required some level of recategorization of countries into regional in order
to align with current regional groupings. Additionally, the UNHCR does not categorize
countries into regions in their annual data, and countries of nationality and countries of
first asylum were grouped into regions corresponding with Department of State regional
designations. These categorizations and recategorizations into groupings that could be
compared over time are a potential threat to internal validity in this study (see Babbie,
2017). In discussions of the relationship between the Trump administration, it should be
noted that the FYs included in this study only account for a portion of the years of the
Trump administration and do not include presidential determinations for FY20 nor FY21
and do not include arrivals for FY20.
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Recommendations
There are several potential areas for future research to build on this study. I used a
single moderating variable of Senate majority x House majority, but future researchers
could examine the influence of the Senate and House majorities separately. By doing so,
they could identify whether a specific chamber of Congress has more influence on
moderating the annual ceiling, regional allocations, total admissions, or regional
admissions than the chambers combined.
This study controlled for changing global refugee levels, both in the aggregate
and by region. Refugee situations are often caused by armed conflict (Simeon, 2017, p.
2), and conflicts in which the United States has military involvement are known to affect
refugee admissions to the country (Berman, 2011). Including either military conflicts in
general or U.S. military conflicts specifically in future studies could provide insight into
additional causes for the variance in regional allocations and regional admissions.
Previous researchers (Barkdull, et al., 2012; Brown & Scribner, 2014; Gonzalez
Benson, 2016) have mostly focused on the effects of Congressional legislation on refugee
arrivals. This study’s findings highlighted that presidential party affiliation predicts
regional allocations and arrivals for Near East and South Asia, as well as Latin America
and Caribbean. There is room for additional study to be done on other ways in which
presidential administrations affect refugee arrivals through the USRAP.
For a more thorough analysis of the extent to which the Trump administration
constituted a continuation of or departure from prior Republican administrations, a study
that includes data from all FYs impacted by the Trump administration would be useful.
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President Trump issued presidential determinations in FY20 and in FY21. Additionally,
admissions in FY20 were conducted under the Trump administration. Adding these data
to a study would provide a more comprehensive picture of Trump’s impact on refugee
admissions to the United States.
Implications
I conducted this study with the intention of assisting resettlement agencies in
anticipating and preparing for future refugee admissions. Being able to anticipate the
backgrounds of the refugees they will be serving allows resettlement agencies to prepare
for culturally and linguistically appropriate service provision, which may involve changes
in staffing, securing interpreters, translating documents and materials, and training staff
on the cultural backgrounds of the refugees arriving to the United States. Being able to
anticipate the overall number of refugees allows agencies to prepare overall staffing
levels, according to the anticipated number of clients to be served.
This study informs agencies that the admissions ceiling and annual admissions are
not significantly affected by the president’s political party. This study also finds that
resettlement agencies may expect higher Near East and South Asia and Latin America
and Caribbean admissions during a Democratic presidency. Despite the effect of
presidential party affiliation on regional admissions, the effect on Near East and South
Asia admissions accounts for 27.0% of the variance in admissions and the effect on Latin
America and Caribbean admissions accounts for 27.8% of the variance in admissions. As
the remaining 73% and 72.2% of the variances, respectively, have not been accounted for
by presidential party affiliation, it is not recommended that resettlement agencies make
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staffing decisions or other costly organizational changes on the basis of presidential party
alone.
This study also provides resettlement agencies, human rights organizations, and
advocacy groups with ways in which they can focus their advocacy and lobbying efforts.
As presidential party affiliation has been shown to have no significant effect on the
admissions ceiling nor annual admissions, advocacy on increasing the admissions ceiling,
often a focus of resettlement agency advocacy (Feliz, 2015; Lutheran Immigrant and
Refugee Services, 2018; Refugees International, 2020; USCRI, 2001), need not be
partisan focused. This study suggests that presidents exert more influence over the
distribution of refugee arrivals across global regions, which would indicate that the
president, rather than members of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees, is a more
appropriate focus of advocacy on regional allocations. Likewise, this study suggests that
the president is the most appropriate focus for advocacy on the overall admissions
ceiling, rather than Senate and House Judiciary Committee members.
Conclusion
In spite of increasing polarization between Democrats and Republicans on issues
of immigration and refugee policy, presidential party affiliation has no significant effect
on the annual admissions ceiling or annual refugee admissions. Resettlement agencies
can be confident, based on the findings of this study, that refugee admissions are not
significantly affected by the party affiliation of the president. Effects of presidential party
can be seen, however, in higher numbers of refugees from the Near East and South Asia
as well as Latin America and Caribbean under the administrations of Democratic
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presidents. While presidential party may affect the distribution of refugee slots between
regions, they do not account for the majority of the variance in admissions from any
region and do not provide a full accounting for the variances in regional admissions and
the majority of variances in regional allocations (76.9% - 80.8%) and regional admissions
(72.2% - 73.0%) is due to factors other than presidential party affiliation that can be the
focus of future study in this area.
The rhetoric of Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and Presidency related to
immigrants in general and refugees in specific resulted in an explosion of literature on
Trump’s takes on refugee policy, with many articles characterizing admissions ceilings,
regional allocations, and refugee admissions under the Trump administration as
anomalies when compared to the rest of the USRAP’s history since FY81. Contrary to
these characterizations, no admissions ceiling nor annual admissions total was found to
be an outlier when considered within the FY81-FY19 dataset, and the only outlier among
regional allocations was for Near East and South Asia in FY19. In terms of regional
admissions, admissions from East Asia in FY18-FY19 and admissions from Near East
and South Asia in FY19 were all found to be outliers during the Trump administration.
These outliers, however, paint a narrower picture of anomalies under the Trump
administration than his own rhetoric might lead one to believe.
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Appendix A: Countries Categorized as East Asia
I categorized countries as being part of East Asia if they were included in the
countries and areas served by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of East Asian and
Pacific Affairs (U.S. Department of State, n.d.b). These countries and areas include
•

Australia

•

Brunei

•

Burma (Myanmar)

•

Cambodia

•

China

•

Fiji

•

Indonesia

•

Japan

•

Kiribati

•

Laos

•

Malaysia

•

Marshall Islands

•

Micronesia

•

Mongolia

•

Nauru

•

New Zealand

•

North Korea

•

Palau
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•

Papua New Guinea

•

Philippines

•

Samoa

•

Singapore

•

Solomon Islands

•

South Korea

•

Taiwan

•

Thailand

•

Timor-Leste

•

Tonga

•

Tuvalu

•

Vanuatu

•

Vietnam

The following countries and areas were represented in the UNHCR’s list of refugee
nationalities and were included in East Asia, despite not being listed as a country or area
served by the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs: Tibet and Niue.
The U.S. Department of State (2019a) noted that Tibet is the Tibet Autonomous Region
and categorizes it as part of China. Tibet was included in East Asia because China is
included in this region. Niue is a territory of New Zealand U.S. Department of State,
2020) and is geographically located between New Zealand and Solomon Islands. Based
on Niue’s geographic location and relationship with New Zealand, it was included in East
Asia.
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Appendix B: Countries Categorized as Eastern Europe and Central Asia
I categorized countries as being part of Eastern Europe & Central Asia if they
were a country or area served by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of European and
Eurasian Affairs. I excluded Western European countries or former Soviet countries
served by the Bureau of South and Central Asia. Countries and areas served by the
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, excluding Western European countries,
include:
•

Albania

•

Armenia

•

Azerbaijan

•

Belarus

•

Bosnia and Herzegovina

•

Bulgaria

•

Croatia

•

Czechia

•

Estonia

•

Georgia

•

Hungary

•

Kosovo

•

Latvia

•

Lithuania

•

Moldova
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•

Montenegro

•

North Macedonia

•

Poland

•

Romania

•

Russian Federation

•

Serbia

•

Slovakia

•

Slovenia

•

Turkey

•

Ukraine (U.S. Department of State, n.d.c)

Former Soviet countries served by the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
include:
•

Kazakhstan

•

Kyrgyzstan

•

Tajikistan

•

Turkmenistan

•

Uzbekistan (U.S. Department of State, n.d.e)

In fiscal years prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, the UNHCR reported refugees from
the Soviet Union. As former Soviet countries are included in Eastern Europe and Central
Asia, the Soviet Union was also included.
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Appendix C: Countries Categorized as Near East and South Asia
I categorized countries as being part of the Near East & South Asia if they were a
country or areas served by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs,
or a country or area served by the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs that was not
already included as part of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Countries and areas served
by the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs include
•

Algeria

•

Bahrain

•

Egypt

•

Iran

•

Iraq

•

Israel

•

Jordan

•

Kuwait

•

Lebanon

•

Libya

•

Morocco

•

Oman

•

Qatar

•

Saudi Arabia

•

Syria

•

Tunisia
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•

United Arab Emirates

•

Yemen (U.S. Department of State, n.d.d)

Countries or areas served by the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs and not
already included as part of Eastern Europe and Central Asia include
•

Afghanistan

•

Bangladesh

•

Bhutan

•

India

•

Maldives

•

Nepal

•

Pakistan

•

Sri Lanka (U.S. Department of State, n.d.e)

The following countries and areas were represented in the UNHCR’s list of
refugee nationalities and were included in Near East & South Asia, despite not being
listed as a country or area served by the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs or the Bureau of
South and Central Asian Affairs: Palestine and Western Sahara.
According to the U.S. Department of State (2016), Israel includes “areas subject to the
jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority” (p. 69), so refugees identified as Palestinian by
the UNHCR were included in Near East & South Asia. Western Sahara is a disputed area
in northern Africa and claimed by Morocco, which administers the majority of the
territory (U.S. Department of State, 2019b, p.1).
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Appendix D: Countries Categorized as Latin America and Caribbean
I categorized countries as being part of Latin America & Caribbean if they were a
country or area served by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of Western Hemisphere
Affairs, excluding Canada (U.S. Department of State, n.d.f). These countries and areas
include
•

Antigua and Barbuda

•

Argentina

•

Bahamas

•

Barbados

•

Belize

•

Bolivia

•

Chile

•

Colombia

•

Costa Rica

•

Cuba

•

Dominica

•

Dominican Republic

•

Ecuador

•

El Salvador

•

Grenada

•

Guatemala

•

Guyana
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•

Haiti

•

Honduras

•

Jamaica

•

Mexico

•

Nicaragua

•

Panama

•

Paraguay

•

Peru

•

Saint Kitts and Nevis

•

Saint Lucia

•

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

•

Suriname

•

Trinidad and Tobago

•

Uruguay

•

Venezuela

The following countries and areas were represented in the UNHCR’s list of
refugee nationalities and were included in Latin America & Caribbean, despite not being
listed as a country or area served by the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs:
•

Cayman Islands

•

Curaçao

•

French Guiana

•

Turks and Caicos Islands
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The U.S. Department of State (2020) lists both the Cayman Islands and the Turks and
Caicos Islands as territories of the United Kingdom. Despite their relationship with the
UK, however, both territories are geographically located in the Caribbean Sea and were,
therefore, included in the Latin America & Caribbean region. Likewise, although
Curaçao is a Dutch territory (U.S. Department of State, 2020), it was included in the
Latin America & Caribbean region due to its location in the Caribbean Sea. French
Guiana is a “first-order administrative [division] of overseas France” (U.S. Department of
State, 2020, para. 5). As French Guiana is located in South America, it was included in
the Latin America & Caribbean region.
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Appendix E: Countries Categorized as Africa
I categorized countries as being part of Africa if they were a country or area
served by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of African Affairs (U.S. Department of
State, n.d.a). These countries and areas include
•

Angola

•

Benin

•

Botswana

•

Burkina Faso

•

Burundi

•

Cabo Verde

•

Cameroon

•

Central African Republic

•

Chad

•

Comoros

•

Côte d’Ivoire

•

Democratic Republic of the Congo

•

Djibouti

•

Equatorial Guinea

•

Eritrea

•

Eswatini

•

Ethiopia

•

Gabon
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•

Gambia

•

Ghana

•

Guinea-Bissau

•

Kenya

•

Lesotho

•

Liberia

•

Madagascar

•

Malawi

•

Mali

•

Mauritania

•

Mauritius

•

Mozambique

•

Namibia

•

Niger

•

Nigeria

•

Republic of the Congo

•

Rwanda

•

São Tomé and Príncipe

•

Sierre Leone

•

Somalia

•

South Africa

•

South Sudan
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•

Sudan

•

Tanzania

•

Togo

•

Uganda

•

Zambia

•

Zimbabwe

